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COMMENT 

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN REAL ESTATE 

TRANSACTIONS: DUAL REPRESENTATION 






In many real estate transactions only one attorney is retained 
and acts for all parties. l When this occurs, there is a good chance 
that at least one client will not receive full representation.2 Dual 
representation3 is virtually always improper in real estate transac­
tions because of the very high probability that conflicts of interest 
will develop.4 When one client's gain results in the other's loss, an 
attorney has usually breached his duty of undivided loyalty if he acts 
1. According to an American Bar Foundation study, in the estimated 5.5 million 
residential purchases made every year, there is only a 40% probability that the purchaser 
will consult a lawyer. Curran, Survey of/he Publics Legal Needs, 64 AB.A J. 848, 850 
(1978). In New England and the states on the eastern seaboard, the usual form of closing 
is one "at which all of the interested parties gather to execute and exchange the necessary 
documents. Such a closing is usually attended by the buyer, the seller, any broker in· 
volved, a representative of the title insurer, if any, and the lawyers, if any, for buyer and 
seller." P. BARRON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE, THE REAL ESTATE SET­
TLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 4 (1975). A second form of closing is used in states like 
California where the parties do not gather for the closing. Instead, an individual referred 
to as an escrow officer collects all the necessary signed documents and payments. Then, 
title or escrow is closed, and, after the documents are recorded, all the funds are transmit­
ted to the parties by the escrow officer. Id at 5. This comment is limited to a discussion 
of the closings of the first type. No attempt is made to address the policies or practices of 
the second. 
2. The term "client" is used loosely here because when the services of an attorney 
are solicited or paid for by his primary client, the other party or parties to the transaction 
are really "quasi-clients or derivative clients," persons to whom the lawyer owes a duty 
secondary to that of his primary client. 
3. As used herein, "dual representation" means one attorney acting for more than 
one party. 
4. See In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 595, 194 A2d 236, 240 (1963). "A conflict of 
interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person represented by the attorney, has in­
terests adverse in any way to the advice or course of action which should be available to 
the present client." Aronson, Conflict ofInterest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 809 (1977). 
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for both.5 
Until the recent adoption by the American Bar Association 
(ABA) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), 
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)6 had been the 
body of rules to which bar associations patterned their codes of eth­
ics. The Model Rules will now be proposed for adoption by the state 
bar associations and state courts that will regulate legal ethics. Dur­
ing this transition period, any understanding of the problems associ­
ated with conflict of interest must begin with an examination of the 
Code and the body of law that has been generated by its influence. 
The Code mandates that a lawyer decline employment if his 
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is 
likely to be adversely affected, or if it would involve him in repre­
senting differing interests.7 Another section of the Code,S however, 
5. "When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of business he is 
entitled to feel that, until that business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the 
undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and champion." 
Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 208 A.2d 82, 84 (1964). 
6. On August 12, 1969, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association 
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFES­
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (1976). This document sets forth the rules by which lawyers 
should perform their profession. It consists of three separate but interrelated parts: Ca­
nons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. 
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the 
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers. . . . The Ethical Con­
siderations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward 
which every member of the professions should strive . . . . The Disciplinary 
Rules. . . are mandatory in character. . . . [They] state the minimum level of 
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary 
action. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as CODE] Preamble 
and Preliminary Statement (1980). The Code has been adopted, sometimes with amend­
ments, in most of the states. 
7. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) reads: 
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent 
professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely 
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely 
to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted 
under DR 5-105(C). 
CODE DR 5-105(A) (footnotes omitted). DR-105(B) provides: 
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his in­
dependent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be 
adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely 
to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted 
under DR 5-105(C). 
CODE DR 5-105(B) (footnotes omitted). 
8. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) reads: 

In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent mul­
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allows dual representation if the attorney can adequately represent 
each client and if the clients, after full disclosure of the effect of such 
representation, consent. Consequently, this leaves the choice for 
dual representation on the conscience of the attorney since a client 
will probably consent to whatever the attorney suggests. 
For some unexplained reason, the code sections that allow dual 
representation presume that a client will be satisfied with a reduced 
level of representation, instead of the zealous representation called 
for in still another Code section.9 These inconsistencies have left the 
legal profession without guidance and the public unprotected. A 
party to a real estate transaction has a right to full representation. 
Anything less is a disservice to the client and a mere pretense by the 
profession. 
Proponents of the single-attorney transaction argue that in­
dependent representation of potentially conflicting interests will re­
sult in duplication of effort and greater expense to individual clients 
with little consequent benefit. JO The purchase or mortgage of a 
home, however, is likely to be one of the most expensive investments 
a person will make in a lifetime. "[T]o permit the representation of 
conflicting interests in the name of efficiency or economic neces­
sity"l) is an unnecessary risk that no client should be encouraged to 
take. This comment will demonstrate the need for a per se rule for­
bidding dual representation in real estate transactions. 
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The ABA is opposed to one lawyer advising all parties in a real 
tiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each 
and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible 
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each. 
CODE DR 5-105(C) (footnotes omitted). 
9. 	 Canon 7: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the 
law." 	 CODE CANON 7. Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) mandates that: 
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: . . . 
(2) [g]ive advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the 
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable 
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client. 
CODE DR 7-104(A) (footnotes omitted). 
10. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept ofProfeSSional Responsibility. 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 702, 728 (1977). See also Comment, Conflicts ofInterests in the Legal Profession, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1303-04 (1981). 
II. Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 967, 970 (1976). See also In re Dolan, 76 N.J. I, 18-19, 
384 A.2d 1076, 1084-85 (1978) (Pashman, J., concurring & dissenting). 
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estate transaction. 12 Despite this opposition, the Code, promulgated 
by the House of Delegates of the ABA,13 allows dual representation 
under certain circumstances. 14 For the most part, state codes of eth­
ics are identical copies of the ABA Code. IS Thus it follows that, in 
many states, a single lawyer, acting within the authority of his state 
code, will be the sole attorney at a closing. 
According to Disciplinary Rule 5-105(c), a lawyer may repre­
sent multiple clients if it is "obvious" that he can "adequately" rep­
resent the interest of each client, and if each "consents" after "full 
disclosure" of the possible effect of such representation on the exer­
cise of the attorney's independent professional judgment. 16 A close 
scrutiny of this section of the Code, however, will reveal its many 
pitfalls. 
A. The Obvious Requirement 
Imagine that there is an ideal real estate transaction in progress. 
The parties have already fixed the terms of their agreement firmly in 
the contract of sale which leaves no issue unresolvedY Neither the 
buyer nor the seller has had any previous connection with the attor­
ney. Each client has chosen Attorney X to represent his interests 
without pressure from some third party. From all outward appear­
ances, Attorney X should feel relatively comfortable about handling 
the transaction for both parties. In a word, it is "obvious" that he 
can adequately represent both of them. All that remains is for the 
attorney to carry out the routine mechanical functions of a clerk.ls 
12. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, AMERI­
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE LAWYER'S PROPER ROLE-SERVICES-COMPENSATION 
(1978) (a position paper authorized to be published by the House of Delegates of the 
ABA on August 9, 1978). 
13. See supra note 6. 
14. See supra note 8. 
15. No state has adopted an ethics code more restrictive in this area than the ABA 
Code. New Jersey, however, has sought to limit the circumstances governing dual repre­
sentation, conflict of interest, full disclosure and informed consent. See In re Dolan 76 
N.J. 1,384 A.2d 1076 (1978), incorporated by reference in N.J. Supreme Court Advisory 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 398 (1979). 
16. See supra note 8. 
17. In practice this is very unlikely. If the contract is prepared by a broker, it is 
likely to contain very few protective provisions because the broker does not want to raise 
any issues that could create tension between the parties. The role of the broker as drafter 
of the sales contact is discussed later in this comment. See liifra notes 70-74 and accom­
panying text. If the parties make their own contract, the probability that it will contain 
conflicting provisions is great. A little knowledge is sometimes a dangerous thing. Of 
course, few sales contracts can anticipate all the potential problems that may arise. 
18. This is essentially what happens when the attorney acts as a scrivener, a prac­
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Should a problem arise, however, for instance relating to the search 
of title, removal of an existing tenant, discovery of a water problem 
in the basement or termites in the woodwork, then the line defining 
what is obvious becomes somewhat blurred. 19 Under such circum­
stances, the attorney would be expected to withdraw from represent­
ing these differing interests.2o To do otherwise would be to breach 
his duty of loyalty to one or the other client. How, then, are the 
parties to resolve their conflict? Attorney X is left with no choice but 
to advise the parties to seek separate counsel in order to assure them 
of adequate representation.21 
B. The Full J)isclosure Requirement 
When an attorney seeks to represent more than one client in a 
real estate transaction, he cannot do so unless each party consents to 
the dual representation. Such consent may be made only after full 
disclosure is made by the attorney of the possible effect of such rep­
resentation on the exercise of the attorney's independentjudgment.22 
This raises the question of what is full disclosure. If the attorney 
elicits full communication from each client, full disclosure is impos­
sible because he must observe a duty of confidentiality23 to both. 
tice followed in this country that developed but was abandoned in Great Britain. "A 
scrivener was a tradesman who arranged loans and prepared the securities which evi­
denced and supported them .... H. KIRK, PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION 127 (1976). 
19. Alter the facts and imagine the pressure on an attorney to complete the transac­
tion if he had a relationship with the broker who referred the sale; or the home sold had 
been constructed recently by the seller, a long-standing client; or attorney X had been on 
the board of directors of the lending institution that had arranged the sweetheart mort­
gage for the buyer. 
20. "If a lawyer accepted such employment and the interests did become actually 
differing, he would have to withdraw from employment with likelihood of resulting 
hardship on the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment 
initially ...." CODE EC 5-15. See a/so In re Lanza 65 N.J. 347, 350-52, 322 A.2d 445, 
447 (1974). 
21. An attorney who represents a buyer and seller in a real estate transaction may 
not continue to represent either party after a controversy has arisen between the clients, 
even though he had advised both clients prior to the controversy of the inherent 
problems of dual representation and received their consent. N.J. Supreme Court Advi­
sory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 212 (1971) reprinted in O. MARU, infra note 33, 
at 285 (1975 Supp.) 
22. Disciplinary Rule 5- 105(C) places the burden of disclosure on the attorney. 
CODE DR 5-105(C). Some attorneys have sought to evidence their disclosure and the 
client's subsequent consent by having the client acknowledge receipt on a written consent 
and waiver form. See In re Dolan 76 N.J. 1,6, 11,384 A.2d 1076, 1078, 1081 (1978). 
23. Disciplinary Rule 4-IOI(A) reads: 
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege 
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the 
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The Code, therefore, must mean something other than the full dis­
closure described in Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C).24 The disclosure 
must be sufficiently limited in scope to protect the clients' confidence 
yet full enough to satisfy the interests of the parties.25 This is noth­
ing less than an impossible task. Any knowledge that the attorney 
might have which would materially jeopardize the interests of one 
party over the other, obviously, cannot be exposed. 
C. The Consent Requirement 
Any valid consent by a client can only be granted after full dis­
closure. To the extent that the disclosure is limited, the consent is 
necessarily tainted. Even assuming full disclosure, "[t]he reality ... 
is that it is well-nigh impossible for the. . . client to be so well at­
tuned to the numerous legal nuances of the transaction that his con­
sent can be said to [be] ... truly informed."26 When the consent is 
induced by a promise by the attorney that the client will be ade­
quately represented, it is doubtful that such consent will be valid.27 
In addition, any last minute waiver and consent forms signed at the 
closing table would be insufficient to satisfy the informed consent 
requirement. This would preclude the client from having any real 
choice, particularly considering the pressures he might feel as a po­
tential homeowner to conclude the transaction. 
D. The Adequate Representation Requirement 
No term within Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) is more elusive than 
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental 
to the client. 
CODE DR 4-IOI(A). Disciplinary Rule 4-IOI(B) states: 
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(I) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. (2) Use a confidence or secret of 
his client to the disadvantage of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his 
client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client con­
sents after full disclosure. 
CODE DR 4-IOI(B) (footnotes omitted). 
24. See supra note 8. 
25. Full disclosure requires that the attorney reveal secrets and confidences that he 
has learned from each client. The test of relevance to the other client is whether knowl­
edge of the secret will materially affect the position or decisions of the other client. If it 
will, then it must be shared. Such a practice, of course, cannot be followed. The revela­
tion of what the attorney knows will cause many deals to fall apart. Thus, it follows that 
an attorney should protect his client's confidences and secrets and admit to the necessity 
of separate representation. 
26. In re Dolan 76 N.J. 1, 14-15,384 A.2d 1076, 1083-84 (1978) (Pashman, J., con­
curring & dissenting). 
27. Id. at 15, 384 A.2d at 1083. 
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the adequate representation requirement. A lawyer's professional 
responsibility must begin and end with concern for his client. When 
there is more than one client to whom he may have a professional 
duty, the problem becomes more complex. At that point, there are at 
least two questions that an attorney must ask himself immediately: 
Who is my client, and what are the services that I must perform for 
him?28 The Code provides little guidance and much confusion in 
this regard.29 "Client identity is ambiguous ... and requires resolu­
tion by conscious choice."30 
When two parties are represented by one attorney, usually one 
client is the primary client while the other is the derivative or quasi­
client. The primary client is someone with whom the attorney al­
ready has an existing attorney-client relationship, while the deriva­
tive client first comes in contact with the attorney as the result of the 
transaction itself.3 1 Because at least one party to the transaction, 
whether it be the broker, lender, seiler, insurer or buyer, has an ex­
isting relationship with the attorney, the choice for dual representa­
tion is the natural consequence of someone's influence. The problem 
of lawyer referral in real estate transactions has been addressed in 
the Code32 and in numerous ethics opinions issued by state bar as­
sociations.33 The lawyer acting alone has a responsibility to both 
28. Decisions to represent more than one client are typically not made with any 
degree of soul-searching. Either the attorney regularly represents more than one client or 
he does not. Often, he will not even meet the other client until the day of the closing. 
29. Nowhere in the Code does it specify a procedure to identify a client. It 
presumes that client identity will always be apparent. Canon 7 requires that the client 
receive the attorney's zealous representation. One must presume, therefore, that all 
others must be held at arm's length. Yet, DR 5-\05(C) allows multiple representation. 
For a provocative discussion of inhibited representation see G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 36-38 (1978). 
30. Id. at 43-45. 
31. From the very beginning, when a buyer and seller, borrower and lender or 
broker come together to formulate a transaction, the potential for lawyer referral is al­
ways present. "Often the parties themselves will initiate and readily consent to joint 
representation to reduce costs." Aronson, supra note 4, at 814. 
32. Selection of a lawyer by a layperson should be made on an informed 
basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties-relatives, friends, ac­
quaintances, business associates, or other lawyers-and disclosure of relevant 
information about the lawyer and his practice may be helpful. A layperson is 
best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed. In order that 
the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek to influence an­
other to recommend his employment. 
CODE EC 2-8. 
33. See generally O. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS (1970 
& Supps. 1975 & 1980). Mr. Maru has compiled ethics opinions from many state and 
local bar associations. The Digest is supported and administered by the ABA. It in­
cludes only formal opinions of the ABA and state and local member associations repre­
sented in the House of Delegates of the ABA. Unless otherwise indicated, the opinions 
" 
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clients in a real estate transaction. It is clear, however, that when 
one party is a primary client, the responsibility to each will not be 
the same.34 
To overcome this imbalance, some members of the bar have 
sought to limit the scope of their representation of the derivative cli­
ent. The Supreme Court of New Jersey sanctioned the concept of 
limited dual representation in In re Kamp.35 The court held that full 
disclosure required that the attorney inform the buyer of his rela­
tionship with the seller and of the limited scope of his intended rep­
resentation of the buyer's interests.36 Aside from seeing that closing 
documents are properly executed and recorded and that funds are 
hereinafter referred to appear in one of the three Maru publications. See Ill. State Bar 
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 598 (1978), reprinted in O. MARU, 
supra, at 169 (1980 Supp.); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 
76-10 (1976), reprinted in O. MARU, supra, at 260-61 (1980 Supp.); N.C. State Bar Coun­
cil Ethics Comm., Formal Ops. CPR-103 (1977),113 (1953), reprinted in O. MARU, supra, 
at 450 (1980 Supp.), 349 (1970); Or. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Ops. 371 
(1977), 118, 102 (1962), reprinted in O. MARU, supra, at 505 (1980 Supp.); Va. State Bar 
Council, Formal Ops. 169 (1971) 114 (1962), 66 (1955), reprinted in O. MARU, supra, at 
472 (1975 Supp.), 491, 485 (1970); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Ops., 
366 (1975), 775 (1965). For opinions involving referrals by builders or developers, see 
Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 108 (1974), reprinted in O. MARU, 
supra, at 248 (1975 Supp.); N.J. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 
Formal Ops. 51 (1964),27 (n.d.), 13 (n.d.), reprinted in O. MARU, supra, at 177, 175, 174 
(1970); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 848 (1960), re­
printedin O. MARu,supra, at 337 (1970); N.C. State Bar Council Ethics Comm., Formal 
Ops. CPR-56 (1975), 820 (1973),624 (1968),114,113 (1953); reprinted in O. MARU, supra, 
at 442 (1980 Supp.), 417, 393 (1975 Supp.), 349 (1970); Va. State Bar Council, Formal 
Ops. 114 (1962), 66 (1955), Informal Op. 18 (n.d.), reprinted in O. MARU, supra, at 491, 
485 (1970), 474 (1975 Supp.); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Responsibility, Informal Ops. 
1261 (1973), 886 (1965). 
34. It would be erroneous to assume that a lawyer who has had a regular attorney­
client relationship with a primary client would be willing or able to set aside that alle­
giance in order to protect both clients fully. Further, 
this two-fold obligation cannot be met in circumstances where the attorney's 
knowledge embraces any fact, known to him as the result of his relationship 
with the [primary client] which, if known to the [derivative client], ... might 
influence him to reject the [transaction] or to insist upon terms or conditions less 
favorable to the [primary client]. 
In re Dolan 76 N.J. I, 16,384 A.2d 1076, 1084 (1978) (Pashrnan, J., concurring & dissent­
ing) (citing N J. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 51, reprinted 
in 87 NJ.L.J. 705 (1964». 
35. 40 N.J. 588, 597, 194 A.2d 236, 240 (1963). 
36. What is so ambiguous about the Kamp decision is that the court looked with 
disdain upon the limited scope of Kamp's retainer. To handle the title work only, the 
majority said, was to perform as if he had a contract for the sale of a commodity. "Such 
an attitude places the practice oflaw in a commercial atmosphere which is wholly foreign 
to the fundamental premise upon which the Canons of Professional Ethics are based, ie., 
that the practice of law is a profession and not a business." Id, 194 A.2d at 241. 
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disbursed, the attorney who acts for a primary client cannot realisti­
cally serve in an advisory capacity to a derivative client. 
The practice of limiting representation has been around for as 
long as the profession itself, and attorneys may establish the scope of 
their employment by contract.37 In Blevin v. MaY.field38 a California 
appellate court indicated that in situations in which clients come to 
an attorney's office having already reached an agreement as to the 
terms of a transaction, the attorney may properly act as a scrivener 
in drawing the deed. In Blevin, the attorney's prior relationship with 
both parties was held not to be a sufficient conflict of interest to com­
pel a reversaP9 
The role of the scrivener, however, is not without its limitations. 
Rarely are all of the terms of an agreement clearly formulated before 
a closing. In keeping with the true role of a scrivener, the attorney 
should not make suggestions to either party about the provisions of 
the deed. The placement of a crucial clause in a mortgage note or 
deed can make a significant difference to each party.40 Examples are 
questions of whether the borrower can prepay the debt without pen­
alty and who will bear the burden of fire protection while the home 
is under construction.41 It is not realistic to suggest that all these 
37. An agreement limiting the scope of representation must be in accord with the 
rules of professional responsibility. The client should not be asked to agree to represen­
tation so limited in scope that it would violate the attorney's duty to provide competent 
representation. Rule 1.2 comment, Services Limited to Particular Purposes. See also 
Annot., 94 A.L.R. 1305 (1981). The proper handling of a particular matter should in­
clude an inquiry into all facts and elements that would have legal consequences for the 
client, and recommendations of what the lawyer believes to be the optimal course of 
action for the client. 
38. 189 Cal. App.2d 649, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1961). 
39. Id. at 652, II Cal. Rptr. at 884. 
40. That is exactly what the Florida Supreme Court stated in Florida Bar v. 
Teitelman, 261 So.2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1972). 
The suggestion that it is merely a 'scrivener's' task borders on the presumptu­
ous. In the completion of legal forms it is what may be left out as well as that 
included which can be a very serious consequence. The advice essential to the 
completion of such documents. . . requires one skilled in the law for a proper 
completion of such matters. . . . 
Id 
41. The drafting of ... instruments is sometimes considered merely routine 
work. This is not true. For example, the description of the parties must be so 
phrased as to prevent confusion, and the description of the land must be com­
plete and accurate. The importance of the form of warranties is often over­
looked. . . . Of equal importance are other special agreements reached earlier 
in the transaction. The controlling law may provide that the deed supersedes 
prior understandings so that if they are not embraced in the deed they are nulli­
fied. Each deed must therefore be examined to determine whether it carries out 
what has been agreed upon. 
See supra note 12, at 7. 
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terms will be predetermined by contract.42 Attorneys who act under 
the guise of scriveners or mere mechanics during the course of dual 
representation are limiting the scope of their employment to a stan­
dard below that necessary for reasonable or adequate representation. 
Whether the above is a description of the adequate representa­
tion referred to in Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) is unknown. One 
other section of the Code states that "[w]hether a lawyer can fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of multiple clients ... depends 
upon an analysis of each case."43 The real test should be whether an 
attorney's evaluation of all facts and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction would permit him to make compatible recommendations 
beneficial to each client.44 If he cannot, then the representation he 
provides should not be considered adequate, and each client would 
be better served by his own attorney. 
III. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATION 
In the typical real estate transaction, there may be several differ­
ent parties whose interests are adverse and represent potential con­
flicts. The purpose of this section is to point out the most common 
conflict areas. Part A addresses the conflicts that are present in the 
attorney's simultaneous representation of multiple clients. Part B 
focuses on the attorney's personal and financial conflicts of interest 
with his client. The relationship of attorneys with title insurance 
companies is examined in Part C. 
A. Simultaneous Representation 
1. Buyer-seller Conflicts 
In a real estate transaction, the positions of seller and buyer are 
inherently susceptible to conflict.45 This is particularly true when the 
attorney has a long standing relationship with one party.46 An obvi­
ous conflict of interest is present when an attorney acts for the seller­
developer in the sale of homes in a subdivision, and the buyers also 
42. The role of the attorney as drafter of the contract is discussed later in this 
comment. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 
250. 
43. CODE EC 5-17. 
44. The test must be an objective one. If another attorney were acting separately 
for the client, the questions should be whether he would make the same recommenda­
tions, point out the same facts and argue for the same protections. 
45. 40 N.J. at 595, 194 A.2d at 240. 
46. In re Dolan, 76 N.J. I" 13-21, 384 A.2d 1076, 1082-86 (1978) (Pashman, J., 
concurring & dissenting). 
83 1983) DUAL REPRESENTATION 
rely on that same attorney to represent their interests. A New Jersey 
decision, In re Dolan, 47 demonstrates this point. One attorney repre­
sented the seller, the purchaser-mortgagor, and the mortgagee. At­
torney Dolan had been successful in arranging the financing through 
a New Jersey mortgage company for the seller-developer's construc­
tion loans as well as the permanent financing for the buyers of the 
townhouses.48 The seller marketed the units through a real estate 
agent whose contract contained a provision which stated that "[i]f 
the purchaser uses the seller's attorney, the seller will pay the legal 
fee for title examination, recording of deed, mortgage survey, mort­
gage title insurance, appraisal and inspection fees."49 
Dolan (or his associate) regularly attended closings in which he 
acted for the seller, purchaser, and the lender. At these closings the 
purchasers were notified for the first time of the potential conflicts of 
interest and were presented with consent forms requiring their ac­
knowledgment of the simultaneous representation. 50 Mindful of the 
potential conflict, the court turned its attention to the consent forms. 
"[I]f any conflicting interest could arise which would stand in the 
way of. . . unstinting zeal, then the client must be informed and the 
attorney may continue his limited representation only with the cli­
ent's informed consent."51 Because of the circumstances surround­
ing the execution of the consent forms, Dolan received a public 
reprimand.52 
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Pashman53 
presented an accurate description of the conflicts existing in similar 
circumstances. 
Any conflicting interests which are potentially disruptive of the 
ultimate goal-the expeditious consummation of the sales transac­
tion-must inevitably be resolved in favor of the primary client 
and for that same reason will probably not even be brought to the 
attention of the derivative client. This problem is even more ag­
gravated in circumstances ... where the primary client of the at­
torney is a developer with whom the attorney has a potentially 
long-term and profitable relationship. Consequently, the attorney 
has a substantial economic stake in maintaining the continued 
47. Id at I, 384 A.2d at 1076. 
48. Id at 4, 384 A.2d at 1077. 
49. Id at 5, 384 A.2d at 1078. 
50. Id at 6, 384 A.2d at 1078. 
51. Id at 9, 384 A.2d at 1080. 
52. Id at 13, 384 A.2d at 1082. 
53. Id at 13-21, 384 A.2d at 1082-86. 
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goodwill of this primary client.54 
While the potential for conflicts between buyers and sellers is 
not limited to new home construction, the incidences of dual repre­
sentation are more prevalent in circumstances where a seller is in a 
position to offer a "package deal," an arrangement in which the 
seller picks up most of the buyer's expenses.55 This, of course, is 
more likely to happen when a seller has more than one unit to sell, 
whether it be old or new. Even when the attorney and seller are 
relatively unsophisticated and come together for a single transaction, 
the potential for conflict is not absent. . The problems that can de­
velop are limitless and the need for separate counsel is important in 
every sale of real estate. 
2. Borrower-lender Conflicts 
It is a common misconception on the part of borrowers that 
lenders have such similar interests that there will be no impropriety 
if an attorney represents both parties. 56 It is true that both are con­
54. Id at 15-16,384 A.2d at 1083. Among the potential areas of controversy out­
lined by Judge Pashman are the following: 
A) Difficulties with the quality of title deliverable by the seller; B) Disputes 
over alleged structural defects; C) Warranties; D) Unfinished work; E) Leaks; 
F) Cellar problems; G) Contruction of roads and sidewalks in the development 
on schedule; H) Drainage problems; I) Problems as to utilities; J) Defective 
masonry foundations; K) Mortgage and tax escrow-amount and interest; 
L) Escrows of a part of seller's money to assure compliance with above 
problems, including schedule for release of funds; M) Appropriate remedies for 
compliance with any agreements concerning the above. 
Id at 15, 384 A.2d at 1083. 
. 55. In the usual package deal the seller-developer picks up most or all of the 
buyer's legal fees as well as other expenses, such as title insurance premium recording 
fees and bank points. The offer by the seller to bear these costs is made at the time the 
contract is signed. Thus it is an obvious incentive to get the buyer to sign the contract of 
sale. Surely these additional expenses of the seller are built into the contract price. 
56. Numerous state bar associations have issued opinions relating to attorneys act­
ing for borrowers and lenders simultaneously. See generally O. MARU, supra note 33. 
See also Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Ops. 51, 29 (1964), reprinted in O. 
MARU, supra note 33, at 77 (1970); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 
64-58 (1965), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 100 (1970); Ill. State Bar Ass'n 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 644 (1980); Me. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 
12 (1980); Advisory Comm. of the Neb. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 77-1 (1977), re­
printed in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 379 (1980 Supp.); N.J. Supreme Court Advisory 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Ops. 243 (1972), 51 (n.d.), reprinted in O. MARU, 
supra note 33, at 293 (1975 Supp.), 177 (1970); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profes­
sional Ethics, Formal Op. 438 (1976), 350 (1974), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 
415 (1980 Supp.), 347 (1975 Supp.); W.Va. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 
78-9 (1978), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 588 (1980 Supp.); See also ABA 
Corom. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1004 (1967), 837 (1965), 582 (1962). The 
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cerned with a few similar aspects of the transaction: the marketabil­
ity of title; the necessity for fire insurance protection; and the 
payment of real estate taxes. The borrower's interest stems from his 
need to possess the property, the lender's, from the possibility it 
might have to foreclose. 
There are other aspects of the borrower-lender relationship, 
however, that are less compatible. The borrower wants to keep all 
costs to a minimum while the lender is in business to make a sub­
stantial profit through interest payments and fees. The points, or fee, 
charged by the lender for making the loan, the interest rate, as well 
as the terms of the loan are all areas of possible contention. The 
lender would prefer an acceleration clause in the note to permit the 
lender to demand full payment if the borrower defaulted under a 
provision of the loan. At the same time, the borrower would prefer 
to prepay the loan without penalty if his circumstances changed dur­
ing the loan period.57 There are numerous other provisions in the 
loan agreement which, by their nature, burden one party and benefit 
the other. Furthermore, terms offered for second mortgages may be 
more demanding, and perhaps more competitive, among lenders. 
Additionally, it is not unusual for attorneys to have alliances or 
business connections with certain lenders. 58 An unwary borrower, 
relying upon a lawyer's biased advice, can be trapped into believing 
that all loan options are the same. A borrower should have in­
dependent counsel at the time of the loan application and later at 
closing.59 Attorneys should not be permitted to arrange mortgage 
financing for their clients when they have an economic tie to the 
lender. 
A case which clearly illustrates the conflicts present in the bor­
rower-lender situation is Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock .60 
The Comstocks brought suit to enjoin a foreclosure of their farm and 
to set aside a mortgage. Crest was a commercial banking institution 
specializing in providing funds for small businesses. Its general 
counsel and chief executive officer was Sidney Kaplan, the appellant. 
After a period of negotiations, Crest entered into a loan agreement 
practice is generally allowed. If foreclosure ensues, however, the general rule is that the 
attorney cannot act for either party. 
57. See supra note 12, at 10-11. 
58. Id at 10. Bar associations have found it ethical for an attorney serving on a 
board of directors of a lending institution to handle loan closings for borrowers. See, 
e.g., N.C. State Bar Council Ethics Comm., Op.· CPR-204 (1979). See generally O. 
MARu, supra note 33, at 466 (1980 Supp.). 
59. See supra note 12, at 4. 
60. 23 Md. App. 280,327 A.2d 891 (1974), cerl. denied, 274 Md. 726 (1975). 
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with the Comstocks which was prepared by Kaplan, who was desig­
nated in the instrument as attorney for all parties. Kaplan had dis­
couraged the borrowers from obtaining their own counsel for the 
transaction. Subsequent to the execution of the loan agreement and 
after it had become apparent that the Comstocks could not complete 
their bargain, the parties sought to modify the terms of the mort­
gage.61 The net result of the modification was that an adjoining par­
cel owned by the Com stocks was conveyed to Crest as additional 
consideration for the extension of the 10an.62 
At trial, "[t]he court concluded that appellant Kaplan, with the 
knowledge of his client, Crest, failed to discharge adequately his 
duty to the Comstocks ..."63 and that the attempted foreclosure of 
the property should be permanently enjoined.64 
On appeal, Kaplan argued that the lower court had erred in 
finding the existence of an attorney-client relationship between him­
self and the borrowers: Kaplan contended that there was, in fact, no 
fiduciary relationship but that it had been a straight business trans­
action.65 The trial court found, based upon the numerous occasions 
the borrowers were dissuaded from seeking independent legal advice 
and the fact that they always had been assured that appellant 
Kaplan was acting on their behalf, that an attorney-client relation­
ship existed.66 Thus, the borrowers "depended on Mr. Kaplan for 
his advice and looked to his knowledge. . . ."67 
Citing authority from other states, the appellate court found 
that an attorney-client relationship may be implied from the conduct 
of the parties and does not depend, unless the parties so specify, 
upon the payment of a fee or the execution of a formal contract.68 
The court further stated that "when an attorney undertakes dual rep­
resentation without making the full disclosure required of him, he 
incurs the risk of civil liability to the client who suffers loss caused by 
such lack of disclosure."69 
61. Id. at 287, 327 A.2d at 896. 
62. Id. at 288, 327 A.2d at 897. 
63. Id. at 292, 327 A.2d at 899. 
64. Id. at 292, 327 A.2d at 900. 
65. Id. at 294, 327 A.2d at 901. 
66. Id. at 295, 327 A.2d at 901. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 296-97, 327 A.2d at 902. 
69. Id. at 302, 327 A.2d at 904. 
87 1983) DUAL REPRESENTATION 
3. Real Estate Broker Conflicts 
The real estate broker plays a major role in real estate transac­
tions throughout the country. He has the potential to control the 
terms of the contract and the representation of the parties.70 Of pri­
mary concern to the bar is the fact that the drafting of a sales con­
tract, which can ultimately fix the rights of the parties, is handled in 
a most commercial, non-legal fashion.7 1 
When the broker has found a potential buyer, negotiations be­
tween the buyer and the seller will begin, with the broker acting in 
the role of intermediary. In some cases the seller will leave the 
broker all the work of negotiation and will merely ratify the agree­
ment reached with the buyer. 
It is generally thOUght that neither the buyer nor the seller 
needs a lawyer in the course of negotiations. . . . In fact, a great 
deal of trouble can be avoided if both the buyer and the seller 
consult their own lawyers during the course of the negotiations. If 
they are to make a proper bargain, they must know what to bar­
gain about.72 
When a broker is in a position to send a great deal of business to 
a particular attorney, common sense dictates that both the broker 
and the attorney have an economic interest in keeping that alliance 
strong. The broker relies upon the attorney to see that the transac­
tion is completed because in most instances, until it is closed, he will 
70. Since a broker builds up alliances with certain attorneys over a period of time, 
it is not unlikely that buyers and sellers will seek his advice relating to choice of counsel. 
71. Lawyers rarely get an opportunity to prepare the contract of sale in the 
small real estate transaction. . . . [T)he lawyer usually finds the contract has 
been signed and the parties-particularly the real estate broker-in a hurry to 
close. Printed contract of sale forms published by lay organizations are used. 
The blank spaces are usually filled in by the seller, his broker or salesman. 
Legal pitfalls are not considered-perhaps not even recognized. 
Blair, The Small Real Estate Transactio~What Should We Do About It? 7 LAW NOTES 
77 (1971) (footnote omitted). California has sought to remedy part of the problem 
through the adoption by the state bar and the California Real Es~ate Association in 1967 
of a form of contract that prominently displays the following warning: "A real estate 
broker is the person qualified to advise on real estate. If you desire legal advice consult 
your attorney." Whitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate, 49 N.C.L. REV. 593, 
630-31 (1971). 
72. See supra note 12, at 3-4. Prior to the time the contract is signed, the buyer and 
the seller should have detailed advice about many legal aspects of the transaction. Of 
particular importance is the issue of which party will pay the cost of services that are 
necessary to complete the transaction and which attorney will provide the services. 
Many people believe that they have little or no control over these aspects of the transac­
tion. In fact, the contract can provide for any arrangement they desire, barring an illegal 
provision, of course. 
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not get his commission.73 When the transaction looks like it may 
collapse, the broker relies on the attorney to smooth over the trouble. 
At the same time, a broker can be a major source of revenue for the 
attorney.74 Because of this silent partnership, if one party, particu­
larly the buyer, does not have separate counsel, the opportunity for a 
legal issue to surface is greatly diminished. Thus, it follows that bro­
kers have a stake in encouraging the practice of dual representation. 
B. Financial Coriflicts with Interests of Clients 
The previous paragraphs have dealt with conflict situations in 
which an attorney has acted for more than one party. In this section, 
the discussion turns to conflicts that arise when an attorney involves 
his client in his own real estate ventures. 
The requirement that an attorney avoid a conflict between his 
client's interest and his own is one that is generally accepted.75 
There is, however, a great temptation for an attorney to lessen his 
loyalty when his personal financial interests conflict with those of his 
client.16 The Code reflects a desire to protect the attorney and the 
client from such an inclination. "Except with the consent of his cli­
ent after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the 
exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be 
or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, prop­
erty, or personal interests."77 
When brought to the attention of the courts, cases involving 
conflicts of interest are closely scrutinized for unfairness if the attor­
ney has benefitted from a business transaction with a client. There is 
73. It is a common belief of many lay people that if there are two brokers involved, 
a co-broker arrangement in which one realtor has listed the property and another is 
showing the home to the buyer, that one is acting for the seller and the other for the 
buyer. This, ofcourse, is not true because each receives his share of the commission from 
the seller and then only when the transaction is closed. Also, each will seek the highest 
selling price because the size of his fee depends on it. 
74. Often a three-sided alliance is created. The seller-developer uses a particular 
broker to sell the homes at a slightly reduced rate due to the volume generated. In re­
turn, the broker steers buyers to a particular attorney who has also acted for the seller in 
completing the earlier zoning or construction financing. This makes a very tight arrange­
ment. See In re Dolan, 76 N.J. I, 5, 384 A.2d 1076, 1078 (1978). See also Whitman, 
Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1339 (1974). 
75. See infra text accompanying note 77. 
76. Aronson, supra note 4, at 816. Lawyers continue to cling to the proposition 
that transactions between themselves and their clients "may still be proper, so long as the 
lawyer enters into them with suitably clean hands, and a suitably pure heart." Chodos, 
Lawyer-client Deals: The End ofan Era, 48 L.A.B. BULL. 407, 410 (1973). 
77. CODE DR 5-IOI(A) (footnote omitted) (1979). 
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a presumption of undue influence, fraud or overreaching that must 
be rebutted for the attorney to avoid discipline.78 Another section of 
the Code79 mandates that "[A] lawyer ... shall not enter into a 
business transaction with a client if they have differing interests 
therein and if the client expects the lawyer to excercise his profes­
sional judgment. . . for the protection of the client, unless the client 
has consented after full disclosure."8o These two sections of the 
Code are fraught with the same ambiguities as Disciplinary Rules 5­
105(A), (B) and (C). That is, the problem of the client's intelligent 
consent which can only follow full disclosure.81 Once again, the 
ABA has used the magical consent and disclosure requirements to 
overcome the obvious lack of independent advice that a client needs 
when faced with such conflicts of interest. There is vagueness, of 
course, attached to the term "differing interests." It is hard to imag­
ine a real estate transaction between an attorney and his client that 
would not have some differing interests.82 The ABA Canons of Pro­
fessional Ethics83 speak of "conflicting interests" rather than "differ­
ing interests" but make no attempt to define them other than the 
statement in Canon 6: "Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer 
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his 
78. Aronson, supra note 4, at 816. 
79. CODE DR 5-104(A). 
80. ld. 
81. Full disclosure and informed consent will presumably satisfy the policy of the 
law sufficiently to overcome the presumption of fraud. But, very few transactions be­
tween lawyers and their clients would actually be closed if the lawyer provided the kind 
of disclosure that the law requires. When entering into a real estate transaction with an 
attorney, there are many facts "which the lawyer would probably advise [his client] to 
learn if the transaction involved only third parties." See Chodos, supra note 76, at 430. 
For instance, the client should know about the financial condition of the lawyer and any 
other proposed investors and whether they would be likely to pull out of the deal at the 
first sign of trouble. "If a dispute ultimately arises, will it work to the client's advantage 
that the lawyer can litigate his claims without cost, while the client must hire new counsel 
at a potentially vast expense ... ?" ld. Obviously, the lawyer would be reluctant to 
articulate any uncertainties that he may have which might discourage the client from 
participating in the transaction. "[W]hen the lawyer expects to become a party to the 
transaction, his judgment must necessarily be obscured to some extent by his own interest 
. . . . [H]is expectation of profit will make him eager to see the deal consummated, and 
this eagerness will color his advice ...." Id. 
82. It is improper for an attorney who acts as money lender mortgagee to perform 
certain incidental legal services that arise in connection with the transaction. A lawyer 
should never represent or advise a party with respect to transactions between that party 
and himself. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 846 (1960), O. MARu,supra note 33, at 336 
(1970). 
83. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS CANON 6 (1908) (amended 1937). 
Before the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted, the pronouncements 
of the ABA took the form of Canons. 
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duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to 
oppose."84 When it comes to a matter of financial benefit to the at­
torney, one cannot expect that he will have the ability to resolve the 
conflict by subordinating his own interests to those of his client. 
A clear example of such a conflict is provided by a New Jersey 
Supreme Court case, In re Krakauer.85 In 1974, Carlos de la Fuente 
and his wife purchased the assets, good will and liquor license of a 
restaurant. At the same time they leased a portion of the building in 
which the restaurant was located from Lipari, the seller of the busi­
ness and the landlord of the property. Throughout these transac­
tions respondent, Attorney Krakauer, represented only Mr. Lipari. 
The de la Fuentes were represented by their own counsel. 86 
Within the same year, a fire destroyed the restaurant premises 
and the de la Fuentes asked respondent to represent them in settling 
the fire loss as well as the reconstruction of the building. With the 
consent of the de la Fuentes and the insurance adjuster, respondent 
received one-half of the ten percent commission paid to the insur­
ance adjuster.87 To facilitate the de la Fuentes' purchase of the 
property, respondent agreed to negotiate a mortgage of $50,000 for a 
ten percent commission. It would be due only if the loan came from 
an outside source, not if it came from the seller in the way of a 
purchase money mortgage. Respondent retained one-third of the 
deposit paid by the de la Fuentes and their joint venturers as his 
legal fee. He also paid himself $5,000 out of the funds received on 
the settlement of the fire loss which were being held in escrow for 
completion of the building. The $5,000 payment represented his fee 
for placing the mortgage although, at that time, he had not arranged 
the mortgage from an outside source.88 
Unknown to the de la Fuentes, respondent set up a sham corpo­
ration for the seller as lender, who had agreed to accept a $53,000 
mortgage at eighteen percent for six and one-half years. For this 
Lipari received a premium of $1,500. This, too, was never revealed 
to the de la Fuentes who believed that the loan came from an outside 
corporation. In addition, respondent submitted a bill for services at 
the closing of $560 for title insurance premium and title work.89 
84. Id 
85. 81 N.J. 32, 404 A.2d 1137 (1979). 
86. Id at 35, 404 A.2d at 1138. 
87. Id at 36, 404 A.2d at 1139. Later, respondent testified that he performed legal 
services in connection with this fee. Id 
88. Id at 37, 404 A.2d at 1139. 
89. Id at 37-38, 404 A.2d at 1139-40. 
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Following the closing, the de la Fuentes obtained new counsel 
who challenged several aspects of the transaction. Through in­
dependent investigation, the new attorney learned that no title 
search had been completed at the time of the closing and no insur­
ance policy had been ordered, although respondent had collected the 
premium. Furthermore, the charter of the corporation from which 
the de la Fuentes had purchased the restaurant business had been 
forfeited in 1971, the lending corporation had been formed by re­
spondent three days after the closing, and the corporation that had 
sold the real estate had forfeited its charter for nonpayment of taxes 
about six months before the closing.9o 
The court found that "in representing the de la Fuentes in con­
nection with their purchase of the property from Lipari, respondent 
did not render the free and loyal representation to which a client is 
entitled.... [At the same time] respondent maintained a continu­
ing professional relationship with Lipari and his interests."91 His re­
tention of the $5,000 violated DR l-102(A)(4).92 Because he let his 
personal interests interfere with his representation of the de la Fuen­
tes and doing so was fraudulant, respondent attorney was suspended 
from the practice of law for one year.93 
One of the problems prevalent in this and similar cases is the 
issue of whether an attorney-client relationship exists at the time of 
the arrangement between the parties. If it can be shown to exist, 
then the attorney will be held to a duty of loyalty to his client and 
the requisite disclosure and consent requirements will come into 
play.94 
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Watkins v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 95 held that the investment of pro­
ceeds of a settlement by an attorney at the client's request and pursu­
90. Id. at 38, 404 A.2d at 1140. 
91. Id. at 39, 404 A.2d at 1140. 
92. CODE DR 1-\o2(A)(4). "A lawyer shall not ... (4) [e]ngage in conduct in­
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id. (footnote omitted). Al­
though the opinion does not mention his violation of Disciplinary Rule 5- \0 I, "Refusing 
Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Profes­
sional Judgment," certainly Attorney Krakauer had his own financial interests in mind 
when he entered into the arrangement to receive a commission for settling the fire loss 
and placing a mortgage, not those of his clients. 
93. Id. at 39, 404 A.2d at 1141. 
94. Amended Rule 16 of the Hawaii Supreme Court applies to an attorney's acts or 
omissions that violate the Code of Professional Responsibility whether or not they oc­
curred under an attorney-client relationship. Hawaii Supreme Court Disciplinary Board, 
Op. 75-1-1 (1975), reprinted in O. MARu, supra note 33, at 174 (1975 Supp.). 
95. 376 So.2d 660 (Ala. 1979). 
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ant to a formal agreement executed when an attorney-client 
relationship existed, was sufficient evidence 
that the parties viewed their relationship as one of attorney and 
client. . . . [T]herefore, it was for the jury to determine whether 
by execution of the investment agreement and promissory note, 
the relationship changed from attorney-client into some other re­
lationship by which coverage would not lie under the terms of the 
... [attorney's liability] policy.96 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine when an attorney­
client relationship begins and ends. Consider, for example, the fol­
lowing scenario: An attorney specializes in conveyancing work and 
has several developers for whom he regularly handles zoning and 
closing matters. Some of them, on occasion, utilize other attorneys 
for subdivision work in different parts of the state. The attorney is 
considered to be a financial specialist and on numerous occasions the 
developers use his services for arranging their mortgage financing. 
Sometimes client A will be the source of mortgage for client B. Dur­
ing the course of this longstanding relationship, the attorney makes 
recommendations about the desirability or certain land deals, some 
of which he already has a financial interest in himself.97 Since it is 
the developer's practice to consult his attorney, sometimes on a daily 
basis about legal matters which affect his existing business, it is hard 
to determine the bounds of their relationship. Should it be assumed 
that when the attorney is talking with the client about other land 
matters that it is at arm's length?98 Where does one draw the line 
between business and legal advice? It is more likely that a certain 
96. Id at 663. In four related cases the same court held that when representing 
people as an investment counselor the attorney surely was acting in a fiduciary capacity 
to each of them and that all of them were undisputedly his clients. Miles v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co. 381 So.2d 13, 14 (Ala. 1980). 
97. "A lawyer should not seek to persuade his client to permit him to invest in an 
undertaking of his client nor make improper use of his professional relationship to influ­
ence his client to invest in an enterprise in which the lawyer is interested." CODE EC 5-3. 
98. The concept of an arm's-length negotiation between a lawyer and his client is a 
contradiction in terms. The reason that lawyers cannot conduct arm's length negotia­
tions with their clients is that they are not at arm's length. They stand, instead, in the 
relationship of fiduciary and beneficiary as a matter of law, and ordinarily stand in a 
relation of trust and confidence as a matter of fact. 
This means that the client is not on guard against imposition, as he would be if 
dealing with an ordinary business adversary; he is not protecting himself as he 
would in an ordinary business transaction; and he expects-and is entitled to 
expect-that his lawyer will look after his interests for him. 
Chodos, supra note 76, at 429 (footnote omitted). 
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reliance develops on the client's part and that neither the attorney 
nor the client can discern what is legal and what is business advice. 
During this contact with the client, there is a strong incentive for 
the attorney to encourage the client to join him or another client in 
one more enterprise based on the attorney's potential for large legal 
fees.99 If the land deal should go sour, however, what recourse does 
the client have? He cannot ask for rescission of the transaction be­
cause he has already invested too much to pull out of the transaction 
and there are often too many other people involved. Because of this, 
not all attorney-client real estate conflicts are litigated. Without in­
dependent counsel the client is at the mercy of his attorney. The 
problem is magnified, of course, when the attorney involves other 
clients in the financing arrangements and places himself in a position 
to receive substantial legal fees from more than one client. loo 
The lawyer who wishes to engage in real estate transactions 
should do so with people other than his clients. If a particular busi­
ness transaction is so irresistible to the attorney, then he must sever 
the attorney-client relationship and be certain that the client obtains 
independent legal advice.101 
C. Strange Bedfellows: Attorneys and Title Companies 
An attorney occupies a high position of professional responsibil­
ity in his relationship with his client. In order to maintain that posi­
tion, he must perform his duties with the utmost good faith, integrity 
and fidelity. "This relationship precludes the attorney from having 
any personal interest antagonistic to those of his client, or from ob­
taining any personal advantage out of the relationship, [especially] 
without the knowledge or consent of his client." 102 When an attor­
ney becomes an agent for a commercial title insurance companylO3 
99. In a fifty lot subdivision, with zoning and closing work, he stands to make 
almost $50,000 in fees. He can expect to receive between $800-1000 per unit if the seller 
pays the buyer's legal fees, based on Connecticut rates. 
100. Such was the case in Ames v. State Bar of Cal., 506 P.2d 625, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
489 (1973). See also In re Belser, 239 S.E.2d 492 (S.c. 1977). 
101. Chodos, supra note 76, at 434. 
102. Byars v. Stone, 186 Va. 518, 529, 42 S.E.2d 847, 852 (1947) (citing 7 C.l.S. 
Atty. & Client § 125 (1916». 
103. The first title insurance company was formed in 1876 as a reaction to the 
judicial limitation of conveyancer's (abstractor's) liability in the Pennsylvania case of 
Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 98 Am. Dec. 213 (1868). Comment, Washington Title 
Insurer's Duty to Search and Disclose, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 213, 215 n.17 (1980). 
The buyer sued [his lay conveyancer] when [it was discovered that] an outstand­
ing judgment clouded the title. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held for the 
defendant, concluding that a conveyancer does not guarantee titles he reviews. 
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or is affiliated with a bar-related companyl04 such as the Connecticut 
Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund,105 he receives what is essentially a 
rebate of his client's title premium. 106 If the attorney acts for the title 
Thus, the first title insurance company was formed by 'lawyers to protect the 
public against the non-liability of lay scriveners following. . . Watson.' 
Id (quoting Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Controversy, 53 
MINN. L. REV. 423, 431-32 (1969». 
Several progressive conveyancers. . . obtained a franchise from the governor 
of Pennsylvania authorizing the conduct of business by the Real Estate Title 
Insurance Company whose contracts guaranteed the accuracy of title examina­
tions and indemnified against loss. From Pennsylvania the concept of title in­
surance as a commercial venture was transplanted into New York and 
Washington D.C., and ultimately throughout the major metropolitan centers of 
the nation. 
Brossman & Rosenberg, Title Companies And The Unauthorized Practice Rules: The Ex­
clusive Domain Reexamined, 83 DICK. L. REV. 437, 446 (1979). 
104. Since the formation of the Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund of Florida in 1947, 
bar-related title insurance companies have sprung into existence in several states. "By 
1976, over 10,000 lawyers in nineteen states were active in nine separate bar-related title 
companies that had assets in excess of eighteen million dollars." Roussel, Pera & Rosen­
berg, Bar-Related Title Insurance Companies: An Antitrust Analysis, 24 YILL. L. REV. 639, 
640-41 (1979). "Bar-related companies are established, managed, and controlled by law­
yers, and offer title insurance only through lawyers to owners or lenders." Id at 645. 
The Florida fund, which has been commended to the bar as a prototype by 
the ABA is simple in operation and illustrates the fund concept. An attorney, 
upon becoming a member of the fund, makes an initial contribution and, there­
after, remits further contributions secured from clients as the fund guarantees 
are issued, all of which are credited to the members account. 
Furthermore, each member is credited annually with his proportionate 
share of income from investments and charged with his share of expenses, in­
cluding losses, as determined by his fund contributions for the year. Guaran­
teed claims attributable to policies issued by a member are chargeable to his 
account. Any remaining credit balance in the member's account is refunded to 
him at prescribed intervals, thus emphasizing the direct financial interest of the 
attorney-member in the welfare of the fund. 
Rosenberg, Why Bar Funds Are Not in the Public Interest, 59 TITLE NEWS II (1980). The 
major purpose of the bar-related title insurance movement is to preserve and expand the 
role of the private attorney in real estate transactions. See ABA Standing Comm. on 
Lawyers' Title Guaranty Funds, How-To-Do-It: Bar-Related Title Assuring Organiza­
tions 9 (1976). 
105. The Connecticut Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., is specifically author­
ized by statute, See Act of July I, 1976. Spec. Act 339, §§ 1-6, 1965 Conn. Spec. Acts 
352-58. Connecticut attorneys who write policies receive a share of the profits or a return 
of reserve credits. See Roussel & Rosenberg, Lawyer-Controlled Title Insurance Compa­
nies: Legal Ethics and the Needfor Insurance Department Regulation, 48 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 25, 31-32 & n.28 (1979). 
106. The practice of commercial title insurance companies paying commissions to 
attorneys developed in the early years when title insurance was a new idea. A company 
would "pay a 'commission' to the lawyer who persuaded his client to buy a policy from 
the title company ...." J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 116 (1978). With the enact­
ment of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 
(codified at 12 U.S.c. §§ 1730f, 1831b, 2601-2617 (1976», as amended by Act of Jan. 2, 
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company and his client simultaneously, by necessity, he surrenders 
his role as independent legal counsel since he can no longer put the 
interests of his client first.t07 The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate the obvious conflicts of interest that are present when 
an attorney accepts compensation from a title company for writing a 
policy for his client. 
The ABA has acknowledged the adverse interests that exist be­
tween the buyer of real estate and the title insurer. In a report issued 
by its Special Committee on Residential Real Estate Transactions, 
and adopted by the House of Delegates of the ABA, the Committee 
stated: 
It is sometimes assumed that there is no conflict between the inter­
ests of the title insurer, on the one hand, and the buyer and lender 
on the other. Any such assumption is false. The insurer wants 
minimum risk, the other parties maximum protection . . . . t08 
What is not understood by the buyer is that, by the nature of the 
contract, the buyer's interests are in conflict with those of the in­
surer. . . . The inherent conflict. . . between the interests of the 
parties stands in the way of the insurer either advising or repre­
senting the insured. . . .109 
Inexplicably, however, the ABA has forgotten its own pro­
nouncements. It has approved the receipt of commissions by a title 
attorney provided the attorney discloses to the client his financial 
interest in the transaction, or credits the client's bill with the amount 
thus received. I to The ABA assumes that an attorney will be able to 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1157 (hereinafter referred to as RESPA) referral fees 
paid to attorneys in situations in which no services are actually performed are illegal. 
See 12 U.S.c. § 2607 (1974) (also known as "Section 8"). 
107. "[Ilf a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client, he may 
feel a sense of responsibility to someone other than his client." CODE EC 5-22. See a/so 
CODE DR 5- J07(A) which reads as follows: "Except with the consent of his client after 
full disclosure, a lawyer shall not: (I) Accept compensation for his legal services from 
one other than his client." Id. 
108. See supra note 12, at II. This dichotomy places the attorney representing 
both a purchaser--either as private counselor as the single attorney involved in a trans­
action-and a title company or agency in an inherent conflict. On the one hand, as 
attorney to the purchaser, he is obligated to point out to his client any exceptions on the 
proposed coverage and attempt to remove them. As principal of the company or agency 
issuing the policy, however, he has a duty to protect his company by excepting those 
circumstances which might result in loss. Regardless of the number of lawyers involved 
in the transaction, these two duties will always conflict when one lawyer represents both 
title insurance company or agency and the purchaser. Roussel & Rosenberg, supra note 
105, at 33. 
109. See supra note 12, at II. 
110. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 304 (1962), reprinted in O. 
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represent the interests of both parties in an adequate fashion. I II 
If an attorney makes a full disclosure of his relationship with, 
and financial interest in, the title insurance company, he places the 
client in the embarrassing position of making a choice that could be 
contrary to the interests of his attorney. At the same time, it is awk­
ward for the attorney to explain why he receives a portion of the 
premium from the title company. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
a large number of attorneys disregard the directions of their bar as­
sociations and fail to disclose these commissions. I 12 In some situa­
tions, title companies delay paying the rebate for a period of time so 
that the connection between the payment and the client is 
obscured. I 13 
Although it is often in the best interests of the client to have title 
insurance protection,114 obviously, the attorney with title company 
connections has a definite monetary interest in recommending it. 
Moreover, with the requirements of today's mortgage market, 115 real 
estate attorneys, who are owners or agents of title companies, have a 
guaranteed commission every time they handle a real estate transac­
tion. 116 Those who advocate these arrangements between attorneys 
MARU supra note 33, at 45 (1970). See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Infor­
mal Op. 883 (1965). 
111. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 331 
(1972), see O. MARU supra note 33, at 2 (1975 Supp.). 
112. Lieberman, supra note 106, at 117. 
113. Id 
114. "The difference between a lawyer's title opinion and a title insurance policy is 
that if there is a hidden defect in the title, the client is indemnified by title insurance, 
although there is no negligence on the part of the lawyer." Balbach, Title Insurance In­
dustry Regulation 67 A.B.A. J. 786, 787 (1981). Insolvency may also be a major defi­
ciency of the lawyer's title opinion. Title insurance relieves this problem by offering a 
solvent insurer to cover the damages for title losses. 
liS. Title insurance is usually required by a lender today as a condition of the 
mortgage commitment. This enables the lender to sell the mortgage on the secondary 
mortgage market. Because of the need on the part of lending institutions for maximum 
liquidity, virtually every mortgage must be packaged to sell. The cost of the policy is 
usually paid for by the borrower-purchaser, although it does not afford him any legal 
protection. 
116. The purchasers of title services are "typically laymen, inexperienced in coping 
with the processes by which titles are assured ...." Whitman, supra note 74, at 1336. 
They do "not comprehend the methods by which title searches, title insurance and clos­
ing services are priced. Further, ... [they are] unaware of the differences in coverage 
between ... different forms of title insurance policies." Id at 1337 (footnote omitted). 
Title insurers compete for the patronage of lawyers, rather than for the pa­
tronage of the ultimate consumer, a process known as 'reverse competition'. 
Reverse competition raises rather than lowers the price of title insurance be­
cause each title company seeks to provide the real estate professional with more 
compensation or benefits in an effort to secure his referrals of prospective poli­
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and title companies argue "that the practicing bar, as a whole, is 
ethical and will subordinate their personal interests to those of their 
clients. . .." 117 Further, the relationship between attorneys and ti­
tle companies "provides the client with the protection of professional 
advice combined with insurance indemnification .... [It] 'offends 
no code of ethics, gives rise to no conflict of interest, and is but a 
wholesome completion of the lawyer's service to the client.'" 118 
Such presumptions deny the obvious intent of attorneys to obtain for 
themselves a significant amount of supplemental income. I 19 
When an attorney is personally interested in a title company 
and its resulting rebates, he has a substantial incentive to complete 
the transaction despite "borderline defects in title." 120 If he is acting 
for the seller, the lender or the buyer as well as the title company, his 
loyalties to himself and the other parties force him to make unfortu­
nate compromises. Imagine, for example, the following circum­
stances: The attorney has represented a real estate developer for a 
period of years in the closings of his newly constructed homes. He is 
also an agent for a title insurance company which provides him with 
sizable rebates for title policies l21 that he issues to lenders and buy­
cyholders. [In Connecticut commercial title insurance companies rebate as 
much as 60% of the title premium to the attorney.] ... To the extent that law­
yers are. . . able to control the placement of title insurance business by refer­
ring prospective policyholders to a specific title company . . . title insurance 
companies ... along with the referring lawyer, [are] beneficiaries of reverse 
competition. 
Roussel, Pera & Rosenberg, supra note 104, at 644-45 (footnotes omitted). Since January 
1, 1984, the Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company also rebates to the attorney 
who processes and prepares a policy, 60% of the premium collected from the consumer. 
117. Va. State Bar Council, Formal Op. 187 (proposed) reprinted in Va. B. News 
47,49 (Dec. 1981). 
118. Balbach, supra note 114, at 787, quoting an editorial in JUDICATURE Nov. 
1967. This has been the position of several state bar association opinions. See generally 
supra note 33; Conn. Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 34 (1982), reprinted in 56 CONN. B.J. 264 
(1982); Conn. Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 23 (1972), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 
437 (1975 Supp.); Ill. State Bar Ass's Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 227 
(1963), reprinted in O. MARU,supra note 33, at 119 (1970); Kan. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 3 
(1952), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 124 (1970); N.J. Supreme Court Advisory 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 12 (n.d.) reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, 
at 174 (1970); N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal 
Op. 309 (1955), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 33, at 332 (1970); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 351 (1974), reprinted in O. MARU, supra note 
33, at 347 (1975 Supp.); But see N.C. State Bar Council Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 17 
(1974), reprinted in 28 N.C. St. B.Q. 63 (1981). 
119. See infra note 121. 
120. Roussel & Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 32. 
121. If an attorney issues title insurance policies for lenders and owners in a fifty­
lot subdivision of new homes whose selling prices range from $70,000-$100,000 and 
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ers of the subdivision lots. Recently, the developer has experienced 
financial difficulties with his subcontractors and the attorney knows 
that there is a good chance that the subcontractor will have a lien 
placed on the property at any time. The developer has arranged to 
transfer to his real estate agent, in lieu of commissions he has earned 
on other homes in the subdivision, four recently constructed homes. 
As part of the terms of the sale, the buyer-agent will obtain the own­
er's title insurance policies which provide affirmative coverage l22 
against mechanics' lien claims. Customarily, on owners' policies, the 
title insurance company requires that the developer provide it with 
waivers of lien123 signed by any person performing services or pro­
viding materials on the new home. In addition, because the title 
company has suffered substantial losses on mechanics' lien claims in 
recent years,124 it will require the developer to sign an indemnity 
agreement holding the company harmless from any loss that might 
anse. 
The developer argues that his attorney should not advise him to 
sign such an agreement since, ultimately, he might have to pay sub­
stantial attorney's fees to the title company should a contractor or 
supplier decide to sue. 125 The title company refuses to waive the 
whose mortgages range from 50-80% of the selling price, the attorney stands to receive a 
substantial amount of supplemental income. With a rebate of 60% of the premium, see 
supra note 116, he could receive as much as $10,250 for owners' and simultaneous lend­
ers' policies. If only lenders' policies were issued, he could receive $4,400 in commis­
sions, based on the commercial title insurance rates established for the State of 
Connecticut, effective Jan. 15, 1982. 
122. "Affirmative coverage" is a positive statement in an insurance policy that a 
particular protection is provided. 
123. A waiver of lien is a document which must be signed by all mechanics or 
materialmen who have provided services or furnished materials on the job site. It typi­
cally contains a description of the property and provides a line for the signature of each 
supplier or contractor. Lien waivers may be of two types. A waiver of priority is usually 
signed by a contractor as an inducement to the bank to advance the forthcoming con­
struction proceeds. Thus, the waiver is limited to the priority of the bank over the con­
tractor's rights. An absolute waiver of lien is a statement that the contractor waives his 
rights to all parties. Often the lien waivers are not legally sufficient to protect the lender 
or th:; owner. Controversies arise relating to the amount that is owed, the date the serv­
ices were performed, and the authorization of the signers. In addition, the potential for 
fraud is always present. At the bottom of each waiver form, there is an affidavit which 
must be executed by the owner or developer. Essentially, the signer must swear that the 
signatures appearing on the waiver are all of those persons who might have a right to 
claim a lien against the property. Obviously, a contractor or supplier would be unwilling 
to sign the waiver if he were uncertain of being paid. 
124. McNitt, A Regulator's View ofthe Title Industry, 56 TITLE NEWS 7,16 (1977). 
125. The developer suggests to his attorney that he get the policies from another 
company. He knows, however, that the attorney will receive a large rebate from the title 
premium. The client wonders whose best interest the attorney has in mind. 
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indemnity requirement; therefore, the attorney has no choice but to 
induce his client to sign the agreement. Failure to obtain such an 
agreement would violate his duty to the title company. While an­
other company may not insist on such an indemnity agreement, the 
attorney is not an agent for any other company. He will lose the 
commissions if he does not write the policies with that company. 126 
Change the facts of the above hypothetical so that a subcontrac­
tor has filed a mechanic's lien against the developer's property. The 
developer disputes the claimant's right to the money and has in­
structed his attorney to defend the claim in court. In the meantime, 
however, the developer wishes to proceed with the sales in his subdi­
vision. A buyer, unaware of the mechanic's lien, comes to the clos­
ing ready to purchase. As a condition of the buyer's mortgage 
commitment, the attorney must provide a mortgagee policy to the 
lender. The attorney knows that in order to obtain title insurance 
protection insuring over the lien,127 even if it is eventually deemed 
invalid, the developer must place in escrow with the title company a 
sum sufficient to cover the lien amount, plus an additional sum to 
cover potential attorney's fees. 128 In addition, the developer must 
also indemnify the title company from any loss it might incur. 
For the developer, this requirement is not one he can easily ac­
commodate since his problems with the subcontractors stem from a 
present shortness of funds. The attorney is in a very uncomfortable 
position. As an agent for the title company, he must act to protect its 
interest completely.l29 As the attorney for the developer, he knows 
that unless the sale goes through his client will be subject to addi­
tional financial pressures. If he issues the policy to the lender know­
ing that the lien exists but without its disclosure, he will be 
committing a fraud.l3O He also has a duty to disclose the lien to the 
126. Once licensed by the state, an attorney may become a title insurance agent for 
more than one company. His loyalty to anyone title company, however, will usually 
depend on the size of the rebates and the "cooperation" he receives from the company in 
providing policies for his clients. See supra note 116. 
127. To insure "over the lien" the title company will make a statement in the insur­
ance policy that, despite the existence of the lien, it affirmatively provides the insured 
with protection from any loss that may arise from it. 
128. Typically, a title insurance company will hold in escrow a sum equal to 150% 
of the amount of the claim. 
129. He must obtain the necessary indemnity agreement and escrow deposit. 
130. In Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962), a title com­
pany sued for damages arising from defendant attorney's erroneous opinions that certain 
titles were clear when, in fact, they were encumbered by outstanding mortgages. Id. 
Damages were awarded for the losses suffered by the title company. Id. at 816. 
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buyer or the buyer's attorney.l3I These hypotheticals are just a sam­
ple of the circumstances that can force an attorney to compromise 
his loyalties. 
A Sixth Circuit case, Collins v. Pioneer Title Insurance Co. , I32 is 
a prime example of the conflicts of interest that arise when an attor­
ney is an agent for a title company and also acts for other interested 
parties. In Collins, an attorney acting under pressure from his clients 
to deliver a clear title and release escrowed funds, submitted a fraud­
ulent title report to the title company.133 The company, relying on 
131. In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lockhart,403 A.2d 1241 (Md. App. 1979), 
the attorney-respondent had certified to a title insurance company that titles were free 
and clear of liens. The court found he was involved in misrepresentation and that his 
conduct had been willful. "An attorney's responsibility to a client requires him to guard 
against unfortunate eventualities .... Respondent should not have gambled that the 
purchasers would ultimately hold title ... free and clear of the liens ...." Id. at 1251. 
Respondent was suspended from the practice oflaw for a period of one year. Id. at 1247. 
132. 629 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1980). 
133. Id. at 432. The facts of the case, although somewhat complex, demonstrate 
clearly the pressures exerted upon an attorney when he acts for more than one party. 
Collins, a Florida Attorney, obtained an option to purchase land in Tennessee. The 
option expired on February 28, 1972. Just before the expiration date, the owners con­
tracted with a second buyer, Chalupsky, to purchase the property subject to the prior 
agreement with Collins. Id. at 431. 
On February 27, 1972, Collins' attorney, defendant Ables, informed him that the 
title was clear. Collins informed the owner's attorney on February 29, 1972 (one day too 
late) that he intended to proceed with the purchase, at which time they set the closing 
date. A few days later, Collins learned of the second sales contract. Id. 
Despite his failure to timely notify the owners of his intent to go forward, Collins 
was able to convince them to proceed with the sale. Shortly thereafter, Ables and Collins 
were notified by the agent for the second buyer that he intended to enforce his claim to 
the land. The Chalupsky suit was filed on March 13, 1972. The owners of the property 
contacted Collins' attorney Ables and retained him to defend the suit. Id. at 431-32. 
A warranty deed running to Collins was backdated to the last date of the option 
period and recorded on March 22, 1972. Collins, intent on protecting his deposit, in­
structed the escrow agent not to release the down payment until the litigation was com­
pleted. Id. at 432. It was also at that time that he requested Ables to secure a policy of 
title insurance for the property. He insisted on a policy which showed no exception for 
the Chalupsky litigation and conditioned release of the down payment on obtaining such 
a policy. Ables was also under pressure from the owners to have the deposit released. 
He succumbed to the pressures from both clients by submitting a preliminary title report 
to Pioneer Title Insurance Company which omitted the reference to the Chalupsky lien. 
Id. 
During the course of the transaction, Ables was an "approved attorney" for Pioneer. 
Id. In the "approved attorney" system, the title insurer predicates the policy on an in­
dependent lawyer's certificate: the policy, therefore, protects against errors the examin­
ing lawyer may have made. Although the insured may sue the title company if a 
nonexempt defect arises, the title company may in turn sue the lawyer if failure to find or 
report such defect constitutes professional error. Comment, supra note 103, at 214 n.13. 
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his report, issued an owner's policy,134 showing the title free of any 
liens. Later, in a suit by a lien holder, the client lost his interest in 
the land and he sued his attorney and the title company for his 
losses. 135 
An interesting issue presented in the case was whether an attor­
ney who acted for the title company was the agent for the title com­
pany or the insured owner. 136 Tennessee had statutes which 
See also Taub, Rights and Remedies Under a Title Policy, 15 REAL PROP., PROD. & 
TRUST 1. 422, 439 (1980). 
Pioneer issued an owner's policy to Collins based solely on the information submit­
ted by Ables. It was several months after the policy was issued that Collins and Ables 
first notified Pioneer of the Chalupsky litigation. After Collins was named a party in the 
suit, he requested Pioneer to represent him pursuant to the terms of the policy. 629 F.2d 
at 432-33. 
Collins lost his claim to the land in the Chalupsky case. Subsequently, he brought 
suit against Pioneer. At trial, the jury found Pioneer liable to Collins on the policy in the 
sum of $50,000. Collins also was awarded $5,000 for Ables' negligence. Id at 433. 
On appeal, Pioneer and Ables argued that Collins' conduct precluded recovery. The 
court agreed and Collins was prohibited from recovering from Pioneer since his agent, 
Ables, misrepresented the status of title by failing to disclose the Chalupsky claim to 
Pioneer. Id 
It is extremely important for the attorney for a prospective insured to be totally 
candid with the proposed title insurer as to any facts known to the attorney that 
might bear on the risk. An attorney whose failure to disclose resulted in the loss 
of title insurance coverage, which in tum resulted in loss to the client, would 
undoubtedly be personally responsible to the client for that loss. 
Pedowitz, Title Insurance-What Every New York Lawyer Should Know, 52 N.Y. ST. B.l. 
394, 397 (1980). 
The Sixth Circuit found that such misrepresentation voided the policy. At the same 
time, Collins was estopped from recovering from Ables because he knew that Ables had 
not disclosed the Chalupsky claim to Pioneer. 629 F.2d at 434. 
Collins argued that Ables acted as Pioneer's agent, and that under agency law it was 
bound by the knowledge of its agent. Two statutes, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-705 (re­
pealed 1975) and 56-35-120 (1980 & Supp. 1982) conflicted on the role of the attorney as 
insurance agent. The court held that § 56-35-120 was applicable. Even if Ables were 
Pioneer's agent, "[t]he principal is not ordinarily charged with the knowledge of the 
agent in a matter where the agent's interests are adverse to those of the principal." Id at 
436 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Hawkins County, 62 Tenn. App. 459, 465, 463 S.W.2d 
946, 949 (1970». 
134. There are two basic types of title policies-the homeowner (or fee) pol­
icy and the mortgagee policy. The homeowner's policy insures the fee against 
title defects for an mdefinite period of time-for as long as the insured retains 
title-while the mortgagee policy covers the fee only during the life of the 
policy. 
P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 259 (1980). 
135. 629 F.2d at 431-33. 
136. In Weir v. City Title Ins. Co., 125 N.l. Super. 23, 308 A.2d 357 (1973), a 
failure by the attorney for the insured to disclose conditions affecting the risk made the 
contract voidable at the insurer's option. Id at 29-30, 308 A.2d at 361. Although the 
attorney was on the title company's list of approved attorneys, the court held that this did 
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conflicted as to the role of the attorney as insurance agent. 137 The 
court found, however, that even if the attorney were the company's 
agent, his knowledge would not be imputed to the title company be­
cause he was acting adversely to the interests of his principal, the 
title company.138 This case did not resolve the related question of 
whether an innocent insured 139 would be precluded from collecting 
under a title policy for damages caused by the fraudulent acts of the 
attorney who issued the policy, because the client in Collins was a 
participant in the nondisclosure of the lien. l40 
The conflicts of interest created by attorney-title company alli­
ances have been largely ignored by the bar in regulating the ethics of 
the legal profession. Ethics opinions141 permitting these dubious 
practices are mere pretexts justifying the obvious self-dealing of at­
torneys. Dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the bar to regulate 
itself has resulted in some pressure for legislative action. To date, 
however, few states have acted to prohibit attorneys from receiving 
commissions, rebates or dividends for issuing title policies for their 
not make him any the less the agent of his client, nor did it make the client any the less 
chargeable with the knowledge of his attorney. Id at 31, 308 A.2d at 362. 
137. 629 F.2d at 435. See supra note 133. 
138. This is consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389, 391, 394 
( 1958). 
139. The client, Collins, was found to be in pari delicto with Ables because he knew 
that Ables had not disclosed the Chalupsky claim to Pioneer. 629 F.2d at 433. 
140. In a choice between an innocent buyer or lender and the title company, the 
result may be different. Farr v. Newman, 14 N.Y.2d 183, 191-93, 199 N.E.2d 369, 373-75, 
250 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278-80 (1964) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). Normally, the agent's 
knowledge is not imputed to his principal when the agent is defrauding or otherwise 
acting against the interest of his principal for the benefit of another. Benedict v. Arnoux, 
154 N.Y. 715,730,49 N.E. 326, 330 (1898). But, the mere fact that the attorney acts for 
more than one party in a real estate transfer will not insulate the client from his agent's 
knowledge. Farr, 14 N.Y.2d at 187, 199 N.E.2d at 373, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 275. A conflict 
of interest does not avoid imputing knowledge. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 282 comment (c) (1958) which states in relevant part: "Meaning of 'acting 
adversely.' The mere fact that the agent's primary interests are not coincident with those 
of the principal does not prevent the latter from being affected by the knowledge of the 
agent if the agent is acting for the principal's interests." Id The comment gives an 
example. "In investigating the title, A discovers an unrecorded equitable interest owned 
by T and, believing that the transaction will not be consummated if he reveals this equity 
to P, conceals his knowledge from P, who buys Blackacre upon A's favorable report. Pis 
affected by A's knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 comment c, 
illustration 4 (1958). See also illustration 5 following comment on subsection 2, clauses 
(a) and (b). It is only when the agent totally abandons his principal's business, as by 
taking a bribe from the grantor for his silence, that the principal is unaffected by the 
agent's knowledge. Id See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 159, 161 
(1958). If the company is held liable for a loss caused by the adverse acts of its agent, it 
would in turn sue him for breach of fiduciary duty. ld §§ 391, 394, 440. 
141. See supra note 118. 
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clients.142 This is primarily because the public has remained igno­
rant of the practice as it exists and has relied on the bar to protect its 
interests. 143 Regulation at the federal level l44 could resolve the 
problem. 
IV. FEDERAL ACTION 
Conveyance practices in the United States have traditionally 
been a matter of local law and custom. 145 Title practitioners and 
other real estate professionals fU!lction in a system which is charac­
terized by little or no competition. 146 Consequently, it is not surpris­
ing that efforts on the federal level to regulate the settlement process 
resulted in a fierce battle by some to protect their vested interests. 147 
142. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-135.1 (1975), which prohibits a real estate 
agent, attorney or lender whose services are incidental to any real estate transaction from 
receiving a rebate, commission or other payment in connection with the issuance of title 
insurance in the same transaction. Any person violating § 58-135.1 is guilty of a misde­
meanor and subject to a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or 
both. See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.4X (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 17:46B-34, 17:46B-35 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); and N.Y. INS. LAW § 440(2) (Mc­
Kinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). 
143. Whitman, supra note 74, at 1336-40. 
144. In Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 72 Ill.2d 179, 380 N.E.2d 790 
(1978), a class action was brought by purchasers and vendors against a title insurance 
company for failure to disclose rebates paid to the bank which ordered and purchased 
title policies for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed that such practices 
could be an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262 (1973). Due to the 
lack of precedent on the state level, the court allowed consideration to be given to the 
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (West 
Supp. 1976). 72 Ill.2d at 184, 380 N.E.2d at 793. Although this suit was based on the 
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act, an alternate route might 
have been through RESPA. See supra note 106. 
145. "Few industries in the United States are as localized, diverse, fragmented, and 
tied to idiosyncratic custom and tradition as those which provide settlement services and 
home financing." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, INTERIM 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SECTION 15 OF THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCE­
DURES ACT OF 1974 at 25 reprinred in Payne, Conveyancing Practice and the Feds: Some 
Thoughts About RESPA, 29 ALA L. REV. 339, 342 n.11 (1978). 
146. See Whitman, supra note 74, at 1329-40. 
147. According to Senator Proxmire, RESPA was "largely the creature of an inten­
sive lobbying campaign by the land title industry to head off any direct limitations on 
excessive charges." OverSight on the Real Estate Sefflemenr Procedures Act of 1914: 
Hearings on S. 2327 and S. 2349 D%re the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1975) [hereinafter cited as OverSight Hearings). 
Lawyers, real estate brokers, mortgage lenders and title insurance companies were a po­
tent influence in curbing the effects of the legislation. Mortgage Sefflement Costs: Hear­
ings on S. 2775 B%re the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs ofthe Senate Comm. 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Ajfairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1972) (remarks of Alvin 
W. Long). 
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The law that ultimately emerged, the Real Estate Settlement Proce­
dures Act (RESPA),148 was the culmination of several years of con­
gressional consideration of real estate costs and practices. 149 Among 
the factors leading to its enactment was the recognition that certain 
abusive practices, prevalent in the settlement industry, increased 
closing costs. 150 Because of intense lobbying by certain interest 
groups, the act in its final form bore little resemblance to the earlier 
bills that had expressed its founding purpose. 151 
A. Before RESPA 
RESPA was signed into law on December 22, 1974 and became 
effective on June 20, 1975. 152 Before its enactment, federal regula­
tion of real estate matters had been limited to the financing of homes 
under programs administered by the Veterans' Administration 
(VA)153 and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).154 In 1969-70, for reasons that are not entirely clear,155 a 
148. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. §§ 1730f, 
1831b, 2601-2617 (1976». 
149. For a detailed chronicle of the events leading to the passage of RESPA see D. 
BURKE, AMERICAN CONVEYANCING PATTERNS 133-77 (1978). 
150. 12 U.S.c. § 2601 (1976). 
151. For instance, the Act was far less comprehensive than H.R. 12066 introduced 
by Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan in 1972, or H.R. 13337 introduced by Congress­
man Patman in 1972. House Bill 13337 (short cited as Real Estate Settlement Cost Re­
form Act of 1972) included provisions intended to eliminate conflicts of interest. Section 
i02(a) sought to correct what has been sometimes referred to as the one lawyer syn­
drome, a practice where one attorney acts for more than one party in a real estate trans­
action. Section i02(a) read as follows: 
No person shall charge any buyer of residential real property who has obtained 
a federally related mortgage loan for services performed by any attorney which 
are incident to or part of a real estate settlement relating to such property unless 
such buyer has personally retailed [sic] such attorney and such attorney repre­
sents only the interests of buyer in connection with such settlement. 
Real Estate Selliement Costs, FHA Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonment, and 
Site Selection Policies: Hearings on H.R. 13337 Before Subcomm. on Housing ifthe House 
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 
Hearings on H.R. 13337]. 
152. RESPA was signed by President Ford on Dec. 22, 1974, but it did not become 
effective until 180 days thereafter. 12 U.S.c. § 2601 (1982). The 180-day period was 
designed to permit the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to im­
plement regulations and to allow settlement service providers time to come into compli­
ance with RESP A. 
153. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4312 (1982). 
154. 24 C.F.R. § 203.27 (1982). 
155. It has been suggested that, perhaps 
accumulated abuses were exaggerated by the efforts of lenders, in a tight money 
market, to increase their take ... [or that] ... borrowers, increasingly hard 
pressed, suddenly became aware of exactions they might have ignored in other 
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tide of opinion developed in Congress to lower the closing costs im­
posed on home buyers. Shortly thereafter, the Emergency Home Fi­
nance Act of 1970156 was enacted. It directed the Secretary of HUD 
and the Administrator of the VA to make an investigation of closing 
costs and report to Congress on its findings. 157 The study and rec­
ommendations included not only government assisted mortgage 
transactions but also all real estate transactions, particularly those in 
which unsophisticated purchasers or sellers were unfamiliar with the 
complex details of transferring title. ISS Among the findings reported 
to Congress in 1972 were the following: 
6. The buyer seldom decides who will provide settlement serv­
ices for him. If there is a choice, he usually depends upon advice 
of the broker, escrow agent, seller or settlement attorney. Often 
the buyer is or believes he is required to deal with a particular 
source for some or all settlement services. 
7. Competitive forces in the conveyancing industry manifest 
themselves in an elaborate system of referral fees, kickbacks, re­
bates, commissions and the like as inducements to those firms and 
individuals who direct the placement of business. These practices 
are widely employed, rarely inure to the benefit of the homebuyer, 
and generally increase total settlement costS.1 59 
For two years following the HUD-VA report, Congress consid­
ered numerous bills restricting settlement costs. 160 The advance dis-
circumstances ... [or that] ... because. the construction industry was in the 
doldrums, at least some members of Congress might have been searching for a 
whipping boy. Payne supra note 145, at 353 n.42. 
156. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 
(1970) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.c.). 
157. They were directed to "undertake a joint study and make recommenda­
tions. . . with respect to legislative and administrative actions which should be taken to 
reduce mortgage settlement costs and to standardize these costs for all geographic areas." 
ld. 
158. H.R. REP. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1970). 
159. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT & VETER­
ANS' ADMINISTRAnON REPORT ON MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS 2-3, reprinted in Real 
Estate Settlement Costs, FHA Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonment, and Site Se­
lection Policies: Hearings Bifore the Subcomm. on Housing ofthe House Comm. on Bank· 
ing and Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972). 
160. H.R. 9989, introduced by Congressman Stephens; H.R. 11183, introduced by 
Congressman Moakley; H.R. 12066 introduced by Congresswoman Sullivan. See Real 
Estate Selllement Cost Hearings on H.R. 9989, H.R. 11183, H.R. 11460 and H.R. 12066 
Bifore the Subcomm. on Housing of the House CO'!7m. on Banking and Currency, 93d 
Congo 1st & 2d Sess. 2, 21, 562 (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Real Estate Sell/ement Cost 
Hearings of1973·74]; S. 3164, introduced by Senator Brook; and S. 3232, introduced by 
Senator Proxmire, S. REP. No. 866, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6546, 6547. 
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closure legislation that emerged was a compromise reached only 
after heated debate in both houses of Congress. 161 As enacted and 
later amended,162 RESPA applies to transactions involving the 
purchase of real property containing a one to four-family dwelling, 
financed by a first mortgage loan that is made by a lender regulated 
or insured by the federal govemment. 163 
B. Disclosure Provision 
Many of RESP A's provisions are directed toward disclosure 
rather than regulation. l64 A special information booklet written by 
HUD must be distributed by lenders to borrowers at the time of a 
mortgage application. 165 It explains in very simple terms the various 
provisions and requirements of RESPA. Of particular importance 
are the references to unfair practices and unreasonable and unneces­
sary charges that can be avoided in the settlement process. 166 Before 
RESP A was amended, the lender was obligated to make advance 
161. 120 CONGo REC. 28, 260-83 (1974); 120 CONGo REC. 24, 735-42 (1974). 
162. See supra note 106. 
163. 12 U.S.c. § 2602(1) (1976) (also referred to as "Section I"). 
164. Id §§ 2603-2605 (repealed by Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-205, § 5, 89 
Stat. 1157, 1158) and 2606 (repealed by Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-205 § 6, 89 
Stat. 1157, 1158). 
165. 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1976) (also referred to as "Section 5"). See OFFICE OF 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND REGULATORY FUNCTIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING 
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SETTLEMENT COSTS: A HUD GUIDE (rev. ed. 1976) re­
printed in P. BARRON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE, THE REAL ESTATE SET­
TLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 6-3 (Cum. Supp. 1982). 
166. Id One section of the booklet entitled "Selecting an Attorney" includes the 
following: 
If you seek the aid of an attorney, first ask what services will be performed for 
what fee. If the fee seems too high, shop for another lawyer . . . . Will the 
attorney represent any other party in the transaction in addition to you? In 
some areas attorneys act as closing agents handling the mechanical aspects of 
the settlement. A lawyer who does this may not fully represent your interests 
since, as closing agent, he would be representing the seller and other interests as 
well. 
Id at 6-10. 
Another section of the booklet entitled "Lender Designation of Settlement Service 
Providers" warns the consumer as follows: 
Some lending institutions follow the practice of designating specific settlement 
service providers to be used for legal services, title examination services, title 
insurance, or the conduct of settlement. 
Where this occurs the lender, under RESPA, is required to provide you as 
part of the good faith estimate a statement in which the lender sets forth: . . . 
[w)hether each designated firm has a business relationship with the lender. 
While designated firms often provide the services needed, a conflict of in­
terest may exist. Take, for example, the situation where the provider must 
choose between your interests and those of the lender. Where legal services are 
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disclosure to the buyer and seller of the actual settlement costs that 
the parties would incur at the time of closing. 167 The goal of the 
information booklet and advance disclosure was to create a more 
informed consumer who would compare costs. This would result in 
better services and more competitive prices. 168 
Shortly after the enactment of RESPA, an enormous outcry by 
the real estate industry, led to more congressional hearings. 169 Legis­
lative action quickly followed. The last vestige of advance disclosure 
of the actual settlement costs was relinquished in a compromise be­
tween both houses. 170 RESPA, as amended,J7J provides that the ob­
involved, it is wise to employ your own attorney to ensure that your interests 
are properly protected. 
Id. at 6-15. This booklet is really the only notice that consumers receive involving the 
potential conflicts of interest present in the settlement process. 
167. 12 U.S.c. § 2605 (1974), amended by 12 U.S.c. § 2605 (1976). 
168. Whether RESPA, through its disclosure provisions, accomplished this goal 
must be seriously doubted. Most commentators agree that the disclosure came far too 
late in the settlement process to have any effect on the choice of settlement providers. 
See Payne, supra note 145, at 360. These doubts were expressed both in and out of 
Congress. It must be assumed that the disclosure route was the course of least resistance 
from the drafters' point of view. Once again, disclosure was used to overcome the defi­
ciencies in the law. As inoffensive as the disclosure provisions of RESPA were, they 
managed to stir up strong feelings almost immediately. The primary complaints centered 
around the twelve-day disclosure period and the heavy paperwork burden imposed upon 
mortgage lenders. See, e.g., Hearings on the Real Estate Selliement Procedures Act of 
1974: Hearings on H.R. 5352, S. 2327 and H.R. 10283 Before the Subcomm. on Housing 
and Community Development ofthe House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 132-36 (1975). 
169. Id. See also OverSight Hearings supra note 147, at 74-80. 
170. Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan was among the strongest proponents of 
the advance disclosure requirement. 
[I]t is . . . taking only five months of real estate industry lobbying pressure to 
convert [RESPA] into a hollow shell which would permit elements of the indus­
try to resume doing many of the very things which made the original law neces­
sary.... The Act [in its final form] was watered down so substantially that all 
of the trade associations in the real estate industry supported it last year .... 
[The proposed amendment S. 2327 is being] promoted by the professionals in 
the real estate industry who perhaps do not want their consumers to learn how 
to negotiate better terms for legal fees, title search, title insurance and other 
expenses of acquiring a mortgage and home .... 
Ideally, every home buyer should have at every stage from sales contract 
signing to settlement a lawyer who represents only the buyer. Instead, the law­
yer whose fee the home buyer is paying is often the lender's lawyer as well, and 
may also be representing the title company, too, and may even be sharing in the 
premium for title insurance. Such arrangements have been documented in our 
hearings. But until home buyers become sophisticated enough to obtain their 
own lawyers before entering into far-reaching real estate transactions, Section 6 
of RESPA, as 'presently written, is their only real protection against excessive 
charges.... 
Dissenting views of Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan to S. 2327 reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADM. NEWS, 94th Congo 1st Sess. 2457-60 (1975)., 
171. The amendment was signed into law on Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. 94-205. 
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ligation to make the information available prior to settlement must 
be triggered by the request of the borrower. The disclosure need not 
be sooner than sometime during the business day preceding the day 
of settlement.172 Essentially, this was a capitulation of the major 
benefit of advance disclosure; it eliminated the consumer's option to 
compare pnces. 
C. Kickbacks 
Among the abuses sought to be remedied by RESPA, the provi­
sion prohibiting the giving or taking of kickbacks l73 is closely con­
nected to the issues of dual representation and conflicts of interest. 
The term "kickback" refers to an arrangement in which a person is 
able to influence or control a source of income. The money paid, the 
kickback, is compensation for referral of business, with little or no 
services provided by the recipient. In the context of purchasing a 
home, the opportunities to refer business to someone are present at 
every stage of the transaction. Studies presented prior to the enact­
ment of RESPA indicated that the prevalence of referral fees, kick­
backs, rebates and commissions produced inflated costs to the 
home buyer. Sections 8 and 9 of the Act 174 were Congress' answer to 
the kickback problem. 
172. 12 U.S.c. § 2603(b) (1976). 
173. 12 U.S.c. § 2607(a) (1976) (also referred to as "Section 8"). 
(a) No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing 
of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise, that 
business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a 
federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any person. (b) No person 
shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of any 
charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service in 
connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan other 
than for services actually performed. (c) Nothing in this section shall be con­
strued as prohibiting (I) the payment of a fee (A) to attorneys at law for services 
actually rendered or (8) by a title company to its duly appointed agent for serv­
ices actually performed in the issuance of a policy of title insurance. . . . 
(d)( I) Any person or persons who violate the provisions of this section shall be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. 
(2) In addition to the penalties provided in paragraph (I) of this subsection, any 
person or persons who violate the provisions of subsection (a) shall be jointly 
and severally liable to the person or persons whose business has been referred 
in an amount equal to three times the value or amount of the fee or thing of 
value, and any person or persons who violate the provisions of subsection (b) 
shall be jointly and severally liable to the person or persons charged for the 
settlement services involved in an amount equal to three times the amount of 
the portion, split, or percentage .... Id 
174. 12 U.S.c. §§ 2607, 2608 (1976). 
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Section 8(a) contains a general prohibition against kickbacks 
and unearned fees. Section 8(b) provides that any fee received must 
be for services actually performed. The penalty for one who gives or 
accepts a kickback l75 may include a fine of $10,000 and imprison­
ment not to exceed one year. 176 
Section 9(a) prohibits a seller from requiring that title insurance 
be purchased by the buyer from a particular title company as a con­
dition to selling the property. Congress' focus on the seller, however, 
is a sleight of hand; that is, a diversion away from other beneficiaries 
of title company rebates. 177 Some land developers undoubtedly in­
fluence their buyers to use particular title companies; nevertheless, 
attorneys have always been 178 and continue to be a primary source 
of referrers of business to title companies and are the recipients of 
commissions or rebates for such referrals. 
Section 8(c) expressly excludes certain payments from the gen­
eral prohibition against kickbacks in Sections 8(a) and 8(b). The 
first two exclusions l79 are relevant to the issue of fees paid to attor­
neys by title companies. The motivation behind them is obvious. 
Once an attorney becomes an agent of a title company, the simple 
preparation of a title application or policy may be enough to satisfy 
175. A kickback may include something other than money. Both RESFA and 
Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § XX part 3500.14(b) (1981) give "payment" or "thing of value" 
the broadest meaning. The regulations suggest several examples of what constitutes a 
thing of value: 
monies, things, discounts, salaries, commissions, fees, duplicate payment of a 
charge, stock, dividends, distributions of partnership profits, credits represent­
ing monies that may be paid at a future date, special bank deposits or accounts, 
banking terms, special loan guarantee terms, services of all types at special or 
free rates, sales or rentals at special prices or rates. 
24 C.F.R. § XX part 3500.14(b) (1981). 
176. 12 U.S.c. § 2607 (d)(I) (1976). 
177. In fact, H.R. 12066, a bill introduced by Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan 
prior to the enactment of RESPA (short titled: Real Estate Settlement and Escrow Act of 
1973) contained a section 9(a) which prohibited an attorney who performed legal services 
incident to a real estate settlement from receiving any commission in connection with the 
issuance of title insurance. See Real Estate Selliement Cost Hearings 0/1973-74 supra 
note 160, at 562, 575. A similar bill introduced by Congressman Patman, H.R. 13337 
also prohibited the payment of commissions to attorneys by title companies. See 1972 
Hearings on H.R. 13]]7 supra note 151, at 303-04. 
178. See supra note 106. 
179. 12 U.S.c. § 2607(c) (1976). "Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
prohibiting (1) the payment of a fee (A) to attorneys at law for services actually rendered 
or (B) by a title company to its duly appointed agent for services actually performed in 
the issuance of a policy of title insurance . . . ." 1d. 
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the "services" mentioned in Sections 8(b) and 8(C)}80 According to 
Regulation X, which clarifies RESPA, a violation may occur if the 
payment received exceeds the reasonable value of the services per­
formed by the attorney.181 Unfortunately, RESPA does not provide 
a test for determining reasonable value. 182 That question must be 
decided by the facts of each case. 
D. The Problem with RESPA 
The basic thrust of RESP A was to reduce settlement costs and 
to enable consumers to understand the process of home purchase 
and settlement. 183 Viewed from that perspective, RESPA is an obvi­
ous failure. 184 Its disclosure provisions have been gutted to the ex­
180. In fact thousands of attorneys in the East receive substantial rebates or com­
missions for the routine preparation of title applications or policies. See supra note 121. 
181. 24 C.F.R. § XX part 3500.14(e) (1981). See also Informal Opinion issued by 
HUD No. 223 dated Aug. 29, 1981 concerning what is meant by RESPA, Section 8(c) as 
it relates to the payment of earned fees by a title company to its duly appointed agent for 
the agent's services to the company. 
Authorized agents would be expected to perform all of the duties normally per­
formed in the issuance of title insurance . . . in order to fall within the provi­
sions of Section 8(c). The mere designation of an individual as an authorized 
agent does not trigger Section 8(c). The non-performance of such services may 
well result in the characterization of an otherwise intended commission to an 
agent as a kickback or an unearned fee. 
[AI violation may occur where commission rates are excessive. While the 
statute does not establish commission rates. . . clearly excessive commissions 
may be a violation. 
reprinted in P. BARRON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE, THE REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 5-218 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Informal Opinions issued by 
HUD are not binding on HUD or any other federal agency. fd. 
182. Appendix B to Regulation X provides examples of facts and comments on 
Section 8 for further clarification of the regulations. The following is an excerpt from 
Appendix B: 
While particular illustrations may refer to particular providers of settlement 
services, such illustrations are applicable by analogy to providers of settlement 
services other than those specifically mentioned. . . . 
6. Facts: A, a real estate broker, obtains all necessary licenses under state law 
to act as a title insurance agent. A refers individuals who are purchasing homes 
in transactions in which A participates as a broker to B, a title company for the 
purchase of title insurance services. A fills out a simple form but performs no 
other services in connection with the issuance of the title insurance policy. B 
pays A a commission for the transactions. 
Comments: The payment of a commission by B to A under circumstances 
where no substantial services are being provided by A to B is a violation of 
Section 8 of RESPA. 
24 C.F.R. § XX part 3500.14 app. B (1981). 
183. See Congressional findings and purpose, 12 U.S.c. § 2601 (1976). 
184. That is exactly what HUD found in its studies following the enactment of 
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tent that they have lost their effectiveness. Section 8's correction of 
abuses is almost nonexistent and Sections 9's is misdirected. 18s 
Although well-intentioned, Congress may have underestimated 
the complexity of the conveyancing problem. Many areas of conflict 
that surfaced during the hearings ultimately were left unattended. 186 
In its myopic focus on reducing closing costs, Congress only 
skimmed the surface of the problem. The cost of services is only the 
threshold issue. What the consumer actually gets for his money is 
the more important question. "High closing costs, if they are associ­
ated with the supply of needed services, are not necessarily objec­
tionable. Likewise, low costs, if they are associated with a low level 
of services, can be counterproductive."ls7 Although high cost is not 
the measure of value, an examination of one without the other is 
senseless. 18s 
One of the major reform goals of RESPA was to educate the 
consumer. Yet, attempts to provide more qualitative information 
were doomed from the start because the educating process began at 
the mortgage application stage. IS9 The information booklet pro­
vided by the lenderl90 is supplied too late in the transaction to allow 
the consumer any effective choice among settlement service provid-
RESPA. As part of Section 2612(a) of RESPA (1976), HUD was directed to submit a 
report to Congress not more than five years from RESPA's enactment, on the I\eed for 
further legislation in the settlement area. After some delay, that report was submitted in 
September of 1981. Among the measures that HUD considered was a requirement that 
lenders of federally related mortgage loans bear the costs of particular real estate settle­
ment services that would otherwise be paid for by borrowers. 12 U.S.c. § 2612(b)(l) 
(1976). 
In its report, See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT RE­
PORT TO CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR FURTHER LEGISLATION IN THE AREA OF REAL 
ESTATE SETTLEMENTS, reprinted in P. BARRON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL Es­
TATE, THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 5-254 through 5-278 (Cum. 
Supp. 1982), HUD enthusiastically recommended the use of lender packaging of settle­
ment services in lieu of RESPA regulation. I d Recommendations, Section IV. A discus­
sion of those recommendations is beyond the scope of this comment. Reference is made 
thereto for an interesting examination of what may be the direction that Congress is 
taking in the settlement area. For an evaluation of the lender pay concept see Stoppello, 
Federal Regulation ofHome Mortgage Settlement Costs: RESPA and its Alternatives, 63 
MINN. L. REV. 367, 398-421 (1979). 
185. See supra notes 170-73, 167 & 178 and accompanying text. 
186. Payne, supra note 145, at 369. 
187. Id at 370. 
188. Id 
189. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. This occurred due to the adoption 
of the federally related mortgage loan as the basis of the exercise of federal power to 
regulate the settlement process. 
190. Id 
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ers}91 Since time is of the essence in a real estate transaction, buyers 
and sellers often defer to the advice of their brokers. 192 The result is 
that consumers are not likely to take extra time to compare settle­
ment prices or services. In addition, many buyers continue to re­
main ignorant of the collusive practices which still permeate the 
settlement process. Attorneys, brokers, land developers, lenders and 
title companies are tied together, sometimes under the color of law, 
in networks which perpetuate the anticompetitive features of the real 
estate market. 193 Any realistic regulation of the settlement problem 
must include a serious effort to educate the consumer at the early 
stages of the transaction. 
V. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 
popularly called the Kutak Commission, was established by the 
ABA in 1977 to consider and make recommendations regarding 
modification of the Code. 194 This led to a final draft of the proposed 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) which was pub­
lished by the ABA Commission on May 30, 1981. 195 Later, the ABA 
191. Most often the selection of an attorney is made at the signing of the contract 
or shortly thereafter. 
192. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential 
Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 944 (1977). 
193. Although RESPA may have eliminated the more blatent kickback arrange­
ments, many abuses still remain. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. Attor­
neys are tied to lenders in various ways, not the least of which is that they often serve on 
bank boards. In addition, as stockholders they wield coercive power in the procurement 
of bank business. While lending institutions have the right to choose their own counsel, 
many borrowers are unrepresented because they mistakenly believe that the lender's at­
torney will protect their interests. RESP A tried to rectify this problem though the use of 
the information booklet. See supra note 166. 24 C.F.R. 3500.7(e) (1982) provides that 
where the lender requires that a particular attorney be used to provide legal services and 
where the buyer will pay all or a portion of the cost of such services, the lender is re­
quired to provide a statement that the provider has a business relationship with the 
lender. ld 
Brokers are often in a position conducive to the referral of business to both attorneys 
and lenders. See Payne, A Typical House Purchase Transaction in the United States, 30 
CONV. & PROP. LAW (n.s.) 194 (1966), reprinted in P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANS­
ACTIONS 4 (1980). Attorneys can reciprocate by utilizing the brokers for appraisal work. 
In addition, if the broker is arranging a mortgage, he may use the attorney's influence 
with the lender to obtain the loan. Attorneys are allowed to accept finder's fees in some 
jurisdictions, whether or not licensed as brokers. The connections between attorneys, 
land developers and title companies have been discussed elsewhere in this comment. See 
supra notes 45-74, \02-44 and accompanying text. 
194. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter cited MODEL RULES] 
Chairman's Introduction (as adopted Aug. 3, 1983). 
195. ld 
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prepared a revised final draft which was submitted to the ABA 
House of Delegates on June 30, 1982. That final draft with further 
revisions, was formally adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at 
its meeting of August 3, 1983, and now represents the official policy 
of the ABA.196 
The Kutak Commission reiterated, in the Model Rules, the fa­
miliar premise that "[l]oyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's 
relationship to a c1ient,"197 but it followed the course ofleast resist­
ance when defining the test of impermissible professional conduct. 
Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules,198 which sets out the general rule on 
conflict of interest, allows the lawyer to represent a client even 
though the lawyer's own interests or other responsibilities might ad­
versely affect the representation of a client. If the lawyer reasonably 
believes l99 that the other responsibilities or interests involved will 
not adversely affect the best interest of the client, and the client con­
sents after consultation,2°O the representation is approved.201 
196. The MODEL RULES, like the MODEL CODE, are "designed to be adopted by 
appropriate agencies both as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession and 
as a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required 
minimum standards stated in the ... rules." MODEL CODE, Preamble and Preliminary 
Statement. 
197. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 comment. 
198. Rule 1.7 reads as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client ifthe representation of that client 
will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad­
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to 
a third person, or by the lawyer'S own interests, unless: 
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad­
versely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advan­
tages and risks involved. 
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7. 
199. "'Reasonably believes' ... when used in reference to a lawyer [means) that 
the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the 
belief is reasonable." MODEL RULES, Terminology. "'Reasonably' when used in rela­
tion to conduct by a lawyer [means) the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent 
lawyer." Id 
200. When representing multiple clients in a single matter, "consultation shall in­
clude explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages 
and risks involved. "MODEL RULES, Rule J.7(b)(2). 
201. A careful reading of Rule J.7 reveals its confusing draftsmanship. Section (a) 
sets forth the general rule: "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of 
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Each model rule is followed by a comment which serves to clar­
ify the meaning of the rule. The comment following Rule l.7 sug­
gests that the critical questions are "the likelihood that a conflict will 
eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the 
lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alterna­
tives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pur­
sued on behalf of the client."202 While these questions accurately 
identify the issues, the fallacy lies in the assumption that an attorney 
could objectively answer them.203 
The comment also provides a test for whether a conflict will ma­
terially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judg­
ment. "[W]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client 
should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the 
lawyer involved cannot properly ask for [the client's consent] ... or 
provide representation on the basis of the client's consent."204 But 
the obvious question is when such a test would ever be employed.205 
the client will be directly adverse to another client ...." MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7(a). 
Subparagraphs (1) and (2) are exceptions to the general rule and can only be read to 
allow the directly adverse representation, if: "(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the rep­
resentation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client, and (2) each 
client consents after consultation." Id The exceptions nullify the rule. If the drafters 
were seeking clarity, they took a circuitous route. By stating the rule in the positive, its 
true meaning becomes clear: A lawyer may represent directly adverse interests if he 
reasonably believes they are not adverse and the client consents. A restatement of the 
rule in this form, however, makes it much less acceptable. 
Section (b) presents the same difficulties. As restated, a lawyer may represent a 
client if the representation materially limits the lawyer's responsibilities to another client 
or to a third person, or his own interests, if he reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected, and the client consents. Each part of the rule requires only the 
lawyer's subjective belief to satisfy the test. 
202. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 comment. 
203. The attorney may not even be competent to determine the possible im­
rairment of his judgment. To do so, the attorney would first have to decide 
objectively' what would be the optimal legal course for each client. Onl7 after 
concluding this analysis could the attorney determine whether the clients inter­
ests are incompatible and the representations therefore inadequate. Yet these 
very assessments are likely to be tainted by the compromising pressures of the 
conflicting interests. 
See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 10, at 1304-05 (1981). 
204. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 comment. The assumption behind the exception to 
Rule 1.7(b) seems to be that an attorney can, when faced with a conflict of interest, treat 
each client equally and ignore his own loyalties or unconscious desires to favor a particu­
larly important client over a less favored client. This requires that the attorney, without 
disclosing any client confidences, offer fair alternatives or courses of action to each client, 
while at the same time urging solutions that are in the best interests of both. Such an 
expectation defies reality. 
205. Unfortunately, the test will be applied only in hindsight, after the client has 
been improperly represented and a complaint has been filed with a disciplinary 
committee. 
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Rule 1.7, like the Code, has left the ultimate decision of repre­
sentation with the attorney, subject only to the unenlightened con­
sent of the client. It goes no further than the test of Disciplinary 
Rule 5-105(C) which required that it be "obvious that he can ade­
quately represent" the client. The problem presented cannot be re­
solved by changing the language from "obvious" to "reasonably 
believes." The answer lies only in a requirement of independent 
counsel. 
The Model Rules adopt a situation approach to conflicts of in­
terest. They provide for different levels of representation depending 
upon the function of the attorney.206 Dual representation in litiga­
tion would be prohibited only in those circumstances in which the 
rights and obligations of the litigants were formally adverse.207 "[A] 
lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose in­
terests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common 
representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned 
in interest even though there is some difference of interest among 
them."208 
Of primary importance to the issue of dual representation is the 
recognition in the Model Rules of the attorney in his role as interme­
diary.209 One form of intermediation includes common representa­
tion where the clients' interests are substantially though not entirely 
compatible.210 According to the Model Rules, if the conditions of 
Rule 2.2 can be met,211 a common representation is possible. The 
policy supporting this dual representation is to avoid "the possibility 
in some situations of incurring additional cost, complication or even 
litigation."212 The provisions of Rule 2.2 are similar to those re­
206. See Rules governing counselor as advisor, intermediary and advocate. 
MODEL RULES, Rules 2.1,2.2,3.1-3.9. 
207. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 comment, Conflicts in Litigation. 
208. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 comment, Other Conflict Situations. 
209. MODEL RULES, Rule 2.2. 
210. Id. at comment. 
211. Id. But see supra note II and accompanying text. 
212. MODEL RULES, Rule 2.2 comment. Rule 2.2 reads as follows: 
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if: 
(I) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications 
of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, 
and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent 
to the common representation; 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on 
terms compatible with the client's best interests, that each client will be able to 
make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of 
material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated reso­
lution is unsuccessful; and 
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quired by Rule 1.7 and Disciplinary Rules 5-105(A),(B) and (C). 
Each has its disclosure213 and consent conditions while leaving it to 
the attorney to decide if he can act impartially and without prejudice 
to each client.214 The disclosure in Rule 2.2(b) requires that it be 
clear to all clients that the lawyer's role as intermediary is not to be 
confused with the usual partisanship of independent counsel.2 15 Ac­
cording to the rule, "[w]here the lawyer is intermediary, the clients 
ordinarily. . . assume greater responsibility for decisions than when 
each client is independently represented."216 
The Model Rules acknowledge the obvious difficulty of keeping 
each client adequately informed while, at the same time, maintain­
ing the confidentiality of the parties. "Complying with both require­
ments while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If 
the balance cannot be maintained, the common representation is im­
proper."217 This would presumably preclude dual representation 
where one client has a long-standing relationship with the 
attorney.218 
Rule 1.8, entitled "Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transac­
tions," enumerates the different prohibited transactions that involve 
conflict of interestper se. Only two are relevant to the subject of this 
comment. The first219 forbids a lawyer from entering into a business, 
financial or property transaction with a client unless the transaction 
is fair and reasonable to the client.220 This is essentially a restate­
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation 
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsi­
bilities the lawyer has to any of the clients. 
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client 
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making 
them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions. 
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so re­
quests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. 
Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients 
in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation. 
Id 
213. In the Model Rules, the term "disclosure" has been replaced by "consulta­
tion" in the Model Rule "Terminology." 
214. See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text. 
215. See MODEL RULES, Consultation in comment following Rule 2.2. 
216. Id 
217. See MODEL RULES, Rule 2.2 comment, Confidentiality and Privilege. 
218. "[A] lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period and in a 
variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between that client and the one to 
whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced." Id 
219. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.8(a). 
220. Id 
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ment of the principle set forth in Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A).221 Be­
cause of the intrinsic unfairness, the exception requires that the 
lawyer establish the equitable nature of the transaction to the client, 
who shall be given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent counse1. The second prohibited transaction222 discour­
ages a lawyer from accepting compensation for representation of a 
client from one other than the client unless the client consents after 
consultation.223 This provision is substantially similar to Discipli­
nary Rule 5-107(A)(I).224 
A comparison of the Model Rules with the Code reveals that the 
Model Rules represent a more permissive philosophy in respect to 
conflicts of interest. This is apparent in a comment to Rule 1.7 
which states: "A possible conflict does not itself preclude the repre­
sentation."225 There are also some obvious ambiguities. For in­
stance, the statement that "[c]ommon representation does not 
diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship"226 
is inconsistent with the statement "the lawyer's role is not that of 
partisanship normally expected in other circumstances."227 The 
Model Rules are basically a consolidation of the principles already 
articulated in the Code. With the exception of minor changes in ter­
minology and format, they do little to expose the unfairness of dual 
representation for parties in real estate transactions. 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The potential for legal problems is present in every real estate 
transaction.228 Beginning with initial negotiations leading to con­
tract of sale, and continuing through financing, title search, drafting 
of documents, closing and the issuance of title insurance policies, the 
necessity for separate legal representation should be obvious.229 For 
many, "the purchase of a house may be the most important legal and 
221. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
222. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.8(f). 
223. Id 
224. See supra note 107. 
225. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7 comment, Loyalty to a Client. 
226. Id Rule 2.2 comment, Withdrawal. 
227. Id Rule 2.2 comment, Consultation. 
228. Blair, The Small Real Estate Transaction-What Should We Do About It? 7 
LAW NOTES 77, 78 (1971). 
229. The ABA's Special Committee on Residential Real Estate Transactions 
spelled out in detail the services needed in the purchase of a horne. See supra note 12. 
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financial transaction of a lifetime."23o The complexity of the trans­
action and the need for an attorney would be admitted readily by 
most buyers and sellers.231 Yet often,232 in order to save a few dol­
lars, or because they are naive, many buyers and sellers consent to 
dual representation. It is not surprising that some will "leap at the 
opportunity to avoid a purportedly unnecessary extra expense when 
they are misled into believing that the ... [other party's] attorney 
can and will give them equally effective representation for free or at 
a lesser cost than if they obtained their own representation."233 
Since dual representation is currently permissible, there remain only 
two ways to overcome the resulting injustice: Educate the public as 
to the pitfalls of dual representation, and enact legislation prohibit­
ing it. 
A. Educating the Public 
Efforts to enlighten consumers on the need for independent rep­
resentation have not been successful.234 Most buyers and sellers 
have had little or no contact with an attorney in the past. The 
thought of choosing one and the expectation of exorbitant legal fees 
are factors that may discourage the retention of an attorney. In ad­
dition, most information that the consumer receives is from other lay 
people or from those who would have a financial stake in the out­
come. Any successful consumer education program must provide an 
unbiased perspective that points out all the legal and financial 
ramifications of the real estate transaction. 
230. Id. at 9. Recent economic reports indicate that the average cost of a new 
home is $91,100. New Haven Register, Aug. 31, 1982 at I, Col. 1. 
231. Some complexity is associated with the latest creative mortgage financing 
brought on by the double-digit interest rates. What once was a simple conventional 
mortgage with equal monthly payments has turned into a hodgepodge of variable ar­
rangements, the ramifications of which would confuse even the most sophisticated bor­
rower. Similarly, a problem created by the tight mortgage market is the assessment of 
discount points to a seller by the lenders. Some lenders will not lend at interest rates 
below the market, and "[s]ince they cannot collect loan discount points from FHA-VA 
borrowers, they collect such points from sellers." Stoppello, supra note 184, at 396. 
When a seller agrees to a certain mortgage contingency in a sales contract, he had better 
know the possible consequences. 
232. See Survey, supra note 1. 
233. In re Dolan, 76 N.J. I, 19,384 A.2d 1076, 1085 (1978) (Pashman, J., concur­
ring & dissenting). 
234. "Because of his lack of knowledge of the market and the services involved, the 
buyer is an easy mark for 'steering' by the broker or lender." Whitman, supra note 74, at 
1339. 
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1. Amending RESPA 
Congress sought to stimulate intelligent choices for borrowers 
when it made the dissemination of information booklets a condition 
ofRESPA.235 Unfortunately, by tying it to the mortgage application 
process, it restricted the booklet's effectiveness.236 The need for legal 
representation at the precontract stage was ignored by Congress, al­
though it was told that such representation was required if the par­
ties were to receive proper protection.237 By selecting the lender, 
with its necessary federal connections as the disburser of disclosure 
materials, Congress intended to avoid a possible jurisdictional chal­
lenge. But, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,238 the separate aspects 
of a home purchase were taken together to form a sufficient connec­
tion with interstate commerce to support federal jurisdiction. As a 
result of this Supreme Court decision, there can be little doubt today 
that any settlement service provider would come under the regula­
tion of RESPA. Congress, therefore, should amend RESP A to pro­
vide for the dissemination of information booklets to buyers and 
sellers before they legally bind themselves.239 The booklets could be 
issued by brokers who are used in over ninety percent of all real 
estate sales,240 or by builders241 if they do not use the services of an 
agent. 242 This would ensure that buyers and sellers would have in­
formation about the settlement process before they committed them­
selves in writing. To be certain that the booklets are distributed in a 
timely manner, the sales contracts utilized by both brokers and 
builders should contain a warning in bold print similar to the 
following: 
WARNING: THIS CONTRACT AFFECTS THE LEGAL 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES WHO 
SIGN IT. No person should affix his signature to this document 
235. See supra notes 159, 164-168 and accompanying texts. 
236. See supra note 168. 
237. Usually, the homebuyer will be given a standard form sales contract to sign. 
Drafted by the local bar association or real estate board, it is likely to be seller oriented. 
"Since there is no one in the picture who represents the home buyer's interests, he will 
have no independent advice as to whether the contract adequately protects him unless he 
obtains his own counsel before signing." Stoppello, supra note 184, at 427. 
238. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
239. This was the recommendation suggested by Ms. Stoppello. See Stoppello, 
supra note 184, at 436. 
240. Id at 435. 
241. Id at 442. As pointed out in the Stoppello article, the builders' activities also 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Id at 441 n.250. 
242. Id at 442. 
120 WESTERN NEW ENGLANJ) LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:73 
until he has read and understood the contents of an information 
booklet approved by HUD which must be provided in accordance 
with Section 5 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 12 
U.S.c. § 2604(a) 1983. Failure of the Seller or his agent to pro­
vide such a booklet is punishable by a penalty of not more than 
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for not more than 
six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court. 
HUD has recognized the need to get settlement information into 
the hands of consumers earlier. To effectuate this goal, the agency 
prepared a consumer booklet called Don't Forget Those Settlement 
Costs which is to be disseminated widely through public service 
advertising.243 
2. Bar Associations 
The ABA's pamphlet entitled Residential Real Estate Transac­
tions: The Lawyer's Proper Role-Services-Compensation 244 raises 
critical issues which should not be ignored by Congress and HUD 
when they move to amend RESP A. The ABA should make every 
effort to encourage its members and those of state and local bar as­
sociations to adopt the principles contained in its pamphlet. Only 
when the bar truly acknowledges the injustice of dual representation 
can an honest effort to educate the public go forward. 
3. Legal Fees 
Most resistance to independent counsel is tied to the consumer's 
belief that legal fees are too high or unjustified. Studies show, how­
ever, that fees paid to attorneys represent only a small percentage of 
the overall charges assessed during settlement.245 The largest share 
of settlement costs are paid to real estate brokers246 whose commis­
sions have come to be accepted as necessary. Although brokers are 
usually paid by sellers, economic theory demonstrates that all trans­
action costs are ultimately passed on to buyers. Since the price of 
real estate has skyrocketed during the last decade, attempts to limit 
the services provided by attorneys are not justified. With so much at 
stake financially for the consumer, the full representation by an at­
243. See P. BARRON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE, THE REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 2-17 n.68 (Cum. Supp. 2, 1981). 
244. See supra note 12. 
245. See Legislative History of P.L. 93-533 (RESPA) U.S. CODE CONGo & ADM. 
NEWS 6563 (1974). 
246. /d 
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torney is needed more now than before.247 
The largest share of legal fees is for services connected with the 
assurance of title.248 In order to avoid duplication of effort and legal 
fees, lenders should be encouraged to accept the title report provided 
by the buyer's attorney. This would eliminate the need for two 
searches of title and excess fees. 249 Also, a builder should be prohib­
ited from paying for his buyer's legal fees. Although it sounds like a 
good deal for the buyer, such a practice encourages dual representa­
tion and other inequitable arrangements. Moreover, it saves nothing 
for the home buyer who ultimately assumes the expense as part of the 
purchase price. 
Other legal expenses usually include the drafting of sales con­
tracts, deeds and mortgages, and representation at closing. These 
costs should be apportioned between buyer and seller. The buyer 
could pay for the cost of his mortgage documents and the seller for 
his deed of conveyance and the necessary releases of liens. The 
preparation of a sales contract could be the expense of both buyer 
and seller and each should have his own attorney participate in its 
formation. Separate counsel is essential at closing in order to pro­
vide the unbiased advice that is necessary. This, more than any 
other service, is at the heart of legal representation. Compared to 
other expenses of settlement, independent representation "is a cost 
that most purchasers would willingly bear if they were aware of its 
potentially significant benefit."250 
4. A vailability of Counsel 
Currently, many consumers relinquish their choice of an attor­
ney because they lack sufficient information to make an intelligent 
selection. To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers 
could be certified as specialists in accordance with procedures in the 
state where they are licensed to practice.251 The state and local bar 
247. See supra note 230. 
248. See an earlier draft of the ABA position paper entitled: Final Draft The 
Proper Role of the Lawyer in Residential Real Estate Transactions and Appropriate 
Methods of Compensating Him for His Services, 19 (1974) supra note 12. 
249. If the buyer'S attorney makes the examination, he can provide advice to his 
client while giving formal title protection to the lender. Since he does not have to pro­
vide advice and representation to the lender, no conflict of interest arises. Id 
250. In re Dolan, 76 N.J. I, 19,384 A.2d 1076, 1085 (1978) (Pashman, J., concur­
ring & dissenting). 
251. Several states have already established certification plans whereby a lawyer 
may be certified as a specialist or expert in a given field by appropriate state authority. 
See Brady v. State Bar, 533 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Amendment to Integ. Rule, 
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associations could then make available, upon request, a list of attor­
neys specializing in real estate252 as well as "the basis on which the 
lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services 
... payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language 
ability; [and] names of references...."253 Bar associations would 
be required to submit the entire list of names to the requesting party. 
This would avoid the customary referral arrangements of brokers, 
builders and lenders that work against a competitive market. 
B. Legislative Reform 
This comment has shown that real estate practice in New Eng­
land and on the eastern seaboard has been quite unsatisfactory. 
Many consumers are not receiving the conflict-free representation 
that they deserve. An important societal interest would be served by 
requiring that lawyers give to clients their undivided loyalty in real 
estate transactions. 
Neither the Code nor the Model Rules have dealt effectively 
with the problem of dual representation. Since closing practices 
throughout the country are so diverse, new legislation on the federal 
level to correct the problem, although encouraged by this writer, is 
unlikely at this time. Adoption of the following proposed statute, 
which prohibits dual representation, would provide a necessary step 
in fulfilling the expectations of the public and in maintaining the 
integrity of the bar. 
PROPOSED ACT 





It is the purpose of this Act to protect the consumer by eliminat­
ing the self-serving conflict of interest situations that exist among 
lenders, land developers, builders, real estate brokers, title insurance 
companies and attorneys who provide settlement services in real es­
tate transactions. 
Section 1 Terminology 
A. For purposes ofthis act, the term "settlement services" includes: 
(I) preparation or review of all documents incident to the 
sale, lease or mortgage of real estate, including but not limited to: 
399 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1981); CONN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-\05A, 
CONN. PRACTICE BOOK 18.1 (Oct. 1982). 
252. See MODEL RULES, Rule 7.4(c). 
253. Id Rule 7.2 comment. 
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a. boundary line agreement; 
b. certificate of title or other title report; 
c. condominium documents; 
d. contract of sale or assignment of contract of sale; 
e. deed of conveyance; 
f. escrow agreement; 
g. financing statement and related security agreement 
as it relates to real property; 
h. joint venture agreement as it relates to real property; 
i. lease or assignment of lease; 
j. modification, assignment or assumption of mortgage 
note or deed; 
k. mortgage note and deed and related papers; 
1. settlement statement; 
m. survey. 
(2) search and examination of title records; 
(3) representation of and advice to a buyer or seller at exe­
cution or assignment of contract of sale; 
(4) representation of and advice to a lessor or lessee at exe­
cution or assignment of lease; 
(5) representation of and advice to a buyer, seller, borrower 
or lender at the settlement of a loan or the transfer of real estate, 
including the disbursement of funds and the delivery and recorda­
tion of documents. 
B. For purposes of this Act, the term "title insurance com­
pany" includes: a company, agency or agent that passes upon and 
makes title insurance underwriting decisions on title risks, including 
the issuance of title insurance policies, binders and endorsements, 
and that maintains a separate and distinct staff and office or offices 
for such purposes. 
Section 2 Prohibitions 
A. No attorney shall charge any person who is a seller, buyer, 
borrower, lender, lessor, lessee, broker or contracting party for settle­
ment services incidental to or part of a real estate transaction, unless 
such person has personally retained such attorney and such attorney 
represents only the interests of such person in connection with such 
real estate transaction. 
B. No attorney who performs any settlement services which 
are incident to or part of any real estate transaction shall represent 
the interests of more than one party, including his own interests inso­
far as he is a buyer, seller, borrower, lender, lessor, lessee, broker or 
contracting party, even ifthe services are performed free of charge or 
paid for by some other person having an interest in the transaction. 
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C. Nothing in Sections (A) or (B) shall be construed as 
preventing an attorney, while acting for a borrower only, from pre­
paring, explaining or supervising the execution of mortgage docu­
ments or related papers as part of the settlement services which are 
incident to or part of a real estate transaction, or from charging said 
borrower for the reasonable expenses of said services. In such event, 
said attorney shall be acting exclusively for said borrower and not 
for the lender. 
D. No attorney who performs any settlement services which 
are incident to or a part of any real estate transaction for a buyer, 
seller, borrower, lender, lessor, lessee, broker or other contracting 
party shall receive directly or indirectly from any title insurance 
company any commission, rebate, dividend, share of stock, discount, 
abatement, credit or reduction of premium, or other payment in con­
nection with the issuance or procurement of a title insurance policy 
on the real estate which is the subject of said transaction. This pro­
hibition shall apply whether the commission, rebate, dividend, share 
of stock, discount, abatement, credit or reduction of premium or 
other payment is received immediately or at a later date and whether 
the premium charged by the title insurance company in connection 
with the issuance of the policy is paid for by the insured or by any 
other person having an interest in the transaction. Nothing herein 
contained shall be construed as preventing the receipt of a commis­
sion, rebate, dividend, share of stock or other payment by a regular 
full-time employee of the title insurance company. 
E. Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, an attorney who 
performs a title search as part of the settlement services which are 
incident to or part of the real estate transaction for a buyer, seller, 
borrower, lender, lessor, lessee or other contracting party, shall not 
be prevented from issuing a title report to a title insurance company 
or from charging a buyer, seller, borrower, lender, lessee or lessor or 
other contracting party for the reasonable expense of preparation of 
said report. In such event, the attorney shall be acting exclusively 
for said buyer, seller, borrower, lender, lessor, lessee or other con­
tracting party and not for the title insurance company. The attor­
ney's duty to the title insurance company shall be limited to the 
accuracy of those matters stated in the opinion of title. 
F. Any attorney or entity violating the provisions of this Act 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine or not more 
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for not more 
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than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court.254 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The proposals suggested herein are focused exclusively on re­
moving the inequities created by dual representation. No effort has 
been made to deal with abuses that are outside the purview of the 
legal services connected with real estate transactions. Recognition 
by the bar of the problem of dual representation and a desire to 
eliminate it have been largely nonexistent. The Model Rules, as ap­
proved by the American Bar Association, do not indicate a positive 
change for the consumer of real estate legal services.255 
It is hoped that the proposed reform measures will result in a 
more equitable and realistic approach to professional responsibility. 
While some of the suggestions are new, a few represent a composite 
of other people's proposals. The pitfalls of dual representation have 
been exposed many times; yet, the public remains unprotected. It is 
time to give this problem serious consideration. The time for action 
is long overdue. 
Gail S. Shaulys 
254. Portions of this statute have been adopted from the Real Estate Settlement 
and Escrow Act of 1973, H.R. 12066, supra note 177; the Real Estate Settlement Cost 
Reform Act of 1972, H.R. 13337,supra note 151; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46B-34 (West Supp. 
1981-1982); and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-135.1 (1975). 
255. Today in England, as the result of the adoption of the Solicitor Practice 
Rules of 1972, the buyer and the vendor must be represented by different attor­
neys. The new rule was forced on the Law Society by the Lord Chancellor, 
acting in conformity with what appeared to be a mandate from the courts. . . . 
Under the new English Rule the mortgagee may employ an independent solici­
tor or may use the buyer'S solicitor .... Under current practice rules a builder 
may not successfully offer a 'package deal' whereby the builder's solicitor does 
all the legal work. 
Payne, supra note 145, at 370-71, n.123 (citations omitted). See also H. KIRK, PORTRAIT 
OF A PROFESSION 152 (1976). 
